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THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DANGEROUS
PRODUCTS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Sidney Shapiro,* Ruth Ruttenberg** & Paul Leigh***
Defective consumer products impose significant costs on consumers
and third parties when they cause fatalities and injuries. This Article
develops a novel approach to measuring the true extent of such costs,
which may not be accurately captured under current methods of estimat-
ing the cost of dangerous products. Current analysis rests on a narrowly
defined set of costs, excluding certain types of costs. The cost-of-injury
estimates utilized in this Article address this omission by quantifying and
incorporating these costs to provide a more complete picture of the true
impact of defective consumer products. The new estimates help to gauge
the true value of the civil liability system.
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INTRODUCTION
The tort system benefits society by deterring the sale of consumer
products that are defective under the relevant common law product liabil-
ity standards.' We will refer to such products as "dangerous products."
From an economic perspective, dangerous products that remain on the
market impose costs on consumers and third parties by causing fatalities
and injuries. This study puts the role of the civil justice system in per-
spective by offering a new methodology to estimate these costs.
Available data either overestimate or underestimate the costs of in-
juries and fatalities resulting from the use of dangerous products. Our
study attempts to improve on existing analytical methods by directly esti-
1 While this is not the only social benefit of the tort system, it is the one that is the focus
of this study. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv.
1093, 1142 (1996) (benefits include the vindication of legal rights, deterrence of undesirable
behavior, and the inducement of investments in safety); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of
Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 Tax. L. REv. 1801, 1831
(1997) (recognizing the humane or progressive benefit of preventing unnecessary deaths and
injuries).
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mating the cost of injuries and fatalities attributable to three dangerous
products: Ford SUV's with Firestone tires, the pharmaceutical drug
Baycol, and All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) with three wheels. In each
case study, we identify the adverse consequences caused by the product
defect and then estimate the costs associated with each consequence us-
ing published data. We arrive at these estimates by employing the cost-
of-injury (COI) approach commonly used in the economic literature, but
we broaden our cost estimates to include costs traditionally excluded
from COI methodology. This extension is necessary to obtain a more
comprehensive estimate of the costs to society of dangerous products.
Because of limited data, we employ a synthetic cohort technique to gen-
erate demographic information on the age of victims and the gender dis-
tribution of injuries for COI measurements. For the same reason, we use
hypothetical scenarios to illustrate and estimate costs not traditionally
considered in COI measurements, which we term "extended costs."
Our methodology offers a different, more complete picture of the
value of the tort system than do existing studies. This approach better
evaluates the significance of preventing torts as a matter of public policy
because it accounts for the society-wide implications of avoidable death
and injury. Our results indicate that the three products we studied cre-
ated nearly $4.7 billion dollars in external costs, excluding extended
costs. These extended costs are potentially greater than costs measured
by a COI methodology; and families and taxpayers may end up paying a
significant portion of extended costs. Our results also suggest that the
compensation awarded under the tort system fails to satisfy the actual
costs created by dangerous products, although our evidence for this point
is weaker than for the prior conclusions.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the economic
significance of measuring the costs of injuries and fatalities resulting
from dangerous products and why available information fails to provide
a good estimate of these costs. Part II explains the methodology we de-
veloped for use in this study. Part IlI presents three case studies based
on available data, and applies the new methodology to present estimates
of actual costs. The Article concludes with an analysis of the implication
of these results for public policy.
I. SOCIAL COSTS
Economic theory identifies the cost of injuries and fatalities caused
by dangerous products as an economic inefficiency. The tort system im-
proves market efficiency by forcing the sellers of dangerous products to
pay for costs that would otherwise be borne by other parties. Available
information, however, is inadequate to allow measurement of the costs
actually caused by dangerous products.
2009]
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A. Economic Theory
Economics recognizes two types of costs associated with the sale
and use of a consumer product. "Internal" costs are costs associated with
the production and sale of a product that is paid for by the manufacturer
of the product.2 A manufacturer, for example, will have to pay for the
labor and raw materials that are necessary to make its product. These
costs are "internal" to the transaction of making and selling the product
in the sense that the seller must pay for these expenses in order to be in
business. "External" costs are costs associated with the making and use
of a product that are paid for by persons other than the seller.3 For exam-
ple, medical expenses paid by a consumer as the result of an injury by a
dangerous product are external costs.
In an efficient market, the seller of a dangerous product would pay
for the external costs resulting from use of the product, and include these
expenses in the product price.4 If the product is sold for a price less than
its internal and external costs, there will be greater demand for the prod-
uct than if it were sold at a higher price reflecting both of these costs, an
economically inefficient outcome.5 Overproduction also reduces aggre-
gate social wealth by creating costs that would not exist if the product
were properly priced.6
As we will show, some of the costs of accidents created by danger-
ous products are borne by the injured person. Less obviously, third par-
ties pay for other costs, such as government programs including
Medicaid and food stamps, which means that the public bears at least
some of the costs created by the sale of dangerous products.7
2 See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 379 (3rd ed. 2003) (defining "internal cost").
3 See FRED BOSSELMAN, JIM Rossi & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, ENERGY, ECONOMICS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 41 (2000) (defining an externality as "a social cost or benefit that has
not been internalized or incurred by the private owner of the resource"); see also SHAPIRO &
TOMArN, supra note 2, at 378 (noting that an externality is also described as a "spillover" cost
because it is a cost that spills over onto someone other than the seller of the product).
4 See Giuseppe Dan Mattacci & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Tort Law, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION OF LAW & ECONOMICS 88 (JUrgen G. Backhaus ed., 2nd ed. 2005) (ex-
plaining that "[t]ort rules should ... be designed to induce parties to internalize the external
costs of the activities").
5 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 315
(6th ed. 1994) (noting that "an industry that charges a price above marginal cost will reduce
quantity demanded through this high price, and so it will produce an output too small for an
efficient allocation of resources. The opposite will be true for an industry whose price is
below marginal social cost.").
6 See id.
7 See infra Part I.D.3.
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B. Total Injury Costs
A number of studies attempt to estimate the total cost of injuries in
the United States or the total cost of specific types of injuries. However,
the -data are not a reliable estimate of the external costs of dangerous
products because the studies fail to apportion the costs due specifically to
dangerous product injuries and fatalities. Finkelstein and his colleagues,
for example, have estimated that the total lifetime cost of injuries from
all sources in the United States in 2000 was $406 billion ($80 billion for
medical treatment costs and $326 billion for lost productivity costs).8
Lawrence and his colleagues estimated the annual costs of non-fatal con-
sumer product injuries to be "approximately $500 billion in 1996, ac-
counting for nearly one-third of the total annual injury costs." 9 These
studies presumably include the cost of injuries and fatalities due to dan-
gerous products, but do not provide a separate estimate of such costs.
The lack of reliable data establishing the proportion of accidents caused
by legally culpable behavior means that there is no direct method of de-
termining what percentage of Finkelstein's $406 billion estimate consti-
tutes social costs from the sale of dangerous products and other types of
tortious behavior.
C. Total Insurance Payments
Insurance claims offer another potential measure of the external cost
of dangerous products. Towers Perrin, an insurance consulting firm, es-
timated that insurance companies and firms which self-insure either paid
or anticipated paying $247 billion in 2006 for expenses associated with
tort litigation.' 0 Although critics of the tort system have misconstrued
this point," 1 the amount of compensation paid by insurance companies or
8 See ERIC A. FINKELSTEIN, PHAEDRA S. CORSO & TED R. MILLER, INCIDENCE AND
ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); DOROTHY P. RICE & ELLEN J.
MACKENZIE, COST OF INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1989). For
additional estimates of the total cost of injuries, see Phaedra Corso et al., Incidence and Life-
time Costs of Injuries in the United States, 12 INJURY PREVENTION 212, 214-15 (2006); Jeffrey
W. Runge, The Cost of Injury, 11 EMERGENCY MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 241 (1993).
9 Bruce A. Lawrence et al., Estimating the Costs of Non-Fatal Consumer Product Inju-
ries in the United States, 7 INJURY CONTROL & SAFETY PROMOTION 97, 97 (2000). The meth-
odology of the Finkelstein and Lawrence studies differ; Lawrence includes more categories of
costs, e.g., insurance administration as well as, importantly, pain and suffering. For another
estimate of the total costs of a specific type of injury, see Ted. R. Miller, Societal Costs of
Transportation Crashes, in THE FULL SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITs OF TRANSPORTATION 281
(David Greene, Donald Jones & Mark Delucchi eds. 1997).
10 See TILLINGHAST INSURANCE CONSULTING, TOWERS PERRIN, 2007 UPDATE ON U.S.
TORT COST TRENDS, at 5, available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?
webc=TILL/USA/2007/200712/tort_2007_1242007.pdf [hereinafter 2007 UPDATE].
11 Some commentators describe cost estimates by Towers Perrin as a "tax" on the Amer-
ican consumers. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The Tort Tax, NATIONAL REVIEW, Mar. 3, 2003,
available at http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof-bartlett/bartlett030303.asp (claiming a 2001
2009]
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self-insurers in tort system adjudications or settlements is a likely proxy
for external costs caused by the sale of dangerous products and other
types of tortious behavior. The insurance industry for dangerous prod-
ucts is designed to compensate victims in accord with tort law which
includes payments for medical costs, lost wages, pain and suffering, and
punitive damages. Studies of workers compensation, for example, rely
on similar insurance payment data to estimate the external costs attributa-
ble to workplace injuries and diseases.12 Unfortunately, the Towers Per-
rin estimate is overinclusive because it includes more than payments
made through the tort system. 13 It is possible to infer from the Towers
Towers Perrin estimate of tort costs amounted to "a tax of 2% on everything in the American
economy that takes $721 per year out of the pockets of every citizen"); Lawrence J. McQuillan
& Hovannes Abramyan, Op-Ed, The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2007, at A18. The tort
tax claim is based on the assumption that the total cost of torts (as estimated by the Towers
Perrin studies) will be passed on to consumers by manufacturers and other sellers in the form
of higher prices, and that this is an undesirable outcome. However, this argument fails to
address the positive effect on society of increased prices, to the extent that tort judgments
reflect legitimate costs to society resulting from preventable accidents. As discussed earlier,
see supra Part I.A, the tort system serves society when it causes manufacturers of dangerous
products to internalize external costs. For the same reason, it is economically desirable for the
tort system to force entities or persons who violate common law product liability standards to
pay for the costs of that behavior. Tort critics seek to obscure the economic efficiency of the
outcome by using the word "tax" and by capitalizing on public disapproval of taxes. This
rhetorical move, however, stands economic theory on its head.
In contrast, it would be socially undesirable for consumers to pay higher prices that are
not the result of manufacturers and others paying for external costs. Tort critics seek to make
this claim by associating the Towers Perrin estimates with stories of apparently outrageous
results in the tort system. The implication is that some significant amount of the total cost of
torts (as estimated by the Towers Perrin studies) reflects erroneous tort settlements and ver-
dicts. This claim is problematic for two reasons. First, by claiming that the entire amount of
an estimate by Towers Perrin estimate is a tort "tax," critics are arguing that the entire amount
reflects erroneous tort settlements and verdicts, an improbable conclusion. Second, the impli-
cation that some significant amount of Towers Perrin estimate reflects erroneous tort settle-
ments and verdicts is unsubstantiated.
The public may understand the tort tax claim to mean that the Towers Perrin estimate is
the amount of money it costs to administer the tort system, but Towers Perrin does not include
the governmental costs of administering the tort system. It presumably does, however, include
the amount of money that tort victims have or will pay to their lawyers in the form of contin-
gent fees. Published data does not indicate what portion of the Towers Perrin estimate is
composed of such fees. Moreover, although the Towers Perrin estimate includes administra-
tive fees (aside from governmental costs), there is also no way of knowing what portion of
these expenses are legitimately transaction costs of defending lawsuits, as opposed to the costs
of running an insurance company in general.
12 See, e.g., J. PAUL LEIGH, STEVEN MARKOWTrz, MARIANNE FAHS & PHILIP LANDRIGAN,
COSTS OF OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES chs. 5, 8 (2000).
13 Towers Perrin includes three cost components in its estimate: the benefits paid or
expected to be paid to third parties, defense costs, and administrative expenses. 2007 UPDATE,
supra note 10, at 7. For insurance companies, the first component, paid benefits, is the esti-
mated total of the money that has been ("paid benefits") or will be paid to tort victims ("in-
curred benefits"). The incurred benefits amount is derived from the amount of money that
insurance companies reserve for payments to potential tort victims. Id. For firms that self-
insure, the estimate of payments to third parties (i.e., tort victims) is based on actual payments
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Perrin data that the insurance industry and companies that self-insure
paid approximately $190 billion in compensation and for the costs of
defending lawsuits.14 Although the $190 billion figure overstates exter-
nal costs by some unknown amount, it is a reasonable assumption that
defense costs are only a relatively small portion of that total, and that
compensation will total close to $190 billion. If this assumption is cor-
rect, the Towers Perrin estimate suggests that various types of torts im-
pose very large external costs each year and substantially decrease social
wealth. Moreover, as we will discuss below, 15 the Towers Perrin esti-
mate does not include the significant external costs that fall on third par-
ties because the tort system does not compensate many of these third
parties for those costs.
D. Jury Verdicts and Settlements
Jury verdicts and settlements are the final source of information
about the external costs of torts, but suffer from two defects. First, the
data are incomplete because available data bases do not include many, if
not most, product liability trial awards and settlements. In addition, jury
verdicts and settlements do not for the most part account for external
costs of dangerous products paid by persons or entities other than plain-
tiffs. Such costs might include costs paid by family members, businesses
who employ tort victims and their families, and by the public sector.
1. Jury Verdict and Settlement Information
The debate over far-reaching changes in the common law of torts
has produced an "abundance of studies-indeed an entire industry of
studies-that have focused on the operation of the tort litigation sys-
by various forms of self-insurance and on the cost of insurance purchased directly from non-
insurance companies. Id. at 9. This portion of the Towers Perrin estimate-actual or antici-
pated payments to tort victims-is an approximation of the total external costs paid by insur-
ance companies or firms that self-insure to persons who have been harmed by tortious
behavior, as determined in adjudications or settlements. The second and third components of
the Towers Perrin estimate are for costs related to the administration and handling of claims.
The second component, defense costs, reflects costs "directly incurred in the defense and in-
vestigation of a claim, as well as general claim handling costs." Id. at 7. The third component,
administrative expenses, reflects "expenses, other than defense costs, incurred by either the
insurance company or self-insured entity in the administration of tort claims." Id. Towers
Perrin does not indicate what portion of its total cost estimate is comprised of the first compo-
nent, benefits to be paid or expected to be paid.
14 Towers Perrin indicates that administrative expenses constituted an average of 23 per-
cent of total tort costs from 2000 to 2006, but it does not indicate how much of the total cost is
made up of defense costs. If one assumes that administrative expenses constitute 23 percent of
the 2006 total insurance company costs, then the insurance industry and self-insured will pay
(or have paid) external costs and defense costs totaling $190.19 billion. Id. at 7.
15 See infra Part I.D.3.
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tem." 16 Analysts have sought to estimate mean and median jury verdicts
in both the federal and state court systems. Table 1 offers a representa-
tive sampling of studies of product liability verdicts in federal court. Ta-
ble 2 does the same for studies of product liability awards in state and
county courts.
TABLE 1: FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY TRIAL AWARDS
Trial AwardYear(s) Mean Median Sample Size
1978-8917 $1,143,000 $205,000 4,217
1980-84 18 $858,000 $197,000 2,284
1979-9319 $1,547,000 $318,000
1991-9220 $2,332,000 $668,000 261
1994-95 2 $284,000 527
2000 22 $368,000 385
TABLE 2: STATE AND COUNTY PRODUCT LIABILITY TRIAL AWARDS
Year(s) Source Trial Award Sample
Years)_Source _ Mean Median Size
1983-8523 Five states $633,000 $150,000 136
1991-9224 75 largest counties in US $727,000 $260,000 -
1985-9625 Franklin County, Ohio $207,560 44
200126 75 largest counties in US $450,000 158
16 Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002).
17 Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Prod-
ucts Liability, 39 UCLA L. RaV. 731, 762-63, 797 (1992).
18 Id. at 767, 797.
19 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statis-
tical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 439 (1996).
20 Id. at 439, 443.
21 ANDREW H. PRESS & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL
TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS 1994-95 4 tbl.5 (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/fttv95.pdf.
22 Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office
of the United States Database: An Initial Theoretical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455,
1494-95 (2003). The actual data indicate a median award for product liability of $486,000
based on 385 verdicts, but the authors question the reliability of this figure because of a prob-
lem with the federal data entry system. After correcting for the problem, the authors hypothe-
size that the true median is closer to $368,000. Id. at 1494. The problem is that the federal
data entry system does not permit the entry of verdicts larger than $999,999.00, which sug-
gests that federal data understates awards of $1 million dollars or more. Id. at 1466.
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2. Limitations of Existing Data
A significant problem with relying on federal databases is that most
tort cases are litigated in the state courts under state tort law. Research-
ers estimate that federal litigation constitutes only 2 percent of all of the
tort cases that are filed.27 The percentage of product liability cases liti-
gated in the federal courts is higher than in state courts, where other
types of torts, such as medical malpractice, are typically litigated; one
estimate is that federal trials constitute 25 percent of all product liability
trials excluding asbestos cases. 28
Data obtained from state courts are also subject to limitations. The
National Center for State Courts collects information about lawsuits filed
in state courts, but there is no broad, systematic data collection effort by
the states for compensation awarded as the result of a trial. 29 Research-
ers have been able to employ public records in some states or counties to
obtain information about product liability case awards. The studies in-
cluded in Table 2 are of this type. There are also reports by private firms
such as Jury Verdict Research, but researchers regard these data as unre-
liable because they are not produced by systematic and representative
sampling.30
A further problem with data from state and federal courts is that
estimates based on trial awards neglect the fact that most tort cases that
result in compensation for plaintiffs are not litigated to the end. Re-
searchers estimate that fewer than 10 percent of lawsuits are resolved
through a trial, 31 and there is little data on how many of the other 90-plus
23 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-99, PRODUCT LIABILITY:
VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES 102 tbl.V.2 (1989), available at http://
archive.gao.gov/d26t7/140004.pdf. The study is based on data from five states: Arizona,
Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id. at 19.
24 CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUB. No. NCJ 154346,
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATES COURTS 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES 5 tbl.6 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf.
25 Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is The Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 315, 334 (1999).
26 THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUB. No.
NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2001 2 tbl.1, 5 tbl.6
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc0l.pdf.
27 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1155 (1992).
28 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 19, 441 (estimating that federal trials account for
approximately 25 percent of product liability actions that do not involve asbestos).
29 See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in
Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627, 635, 635 n.21 (1996); Saks,
supra note 27, at 1206.
30 See Saks, supra note 27, at 1245-46.
31 See William L. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Nam-
ing, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631, 649-52 (1981); Herbert M. Kritzer,
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percent of law suits result in cash payment settlements. 32 More gener-
ally, there is little systematic information available on the total dollar
value of tort settlements or the transaction costs of a settlement for plain-
tiffs or defendants.33 There is also a dearth of studies that would provide
a better quantitative understanding of settlements themselves. 34
Another consideration is whether settlement and trial awards ade-
quately compensate plaintiffs for the damages that they have suffered.
Empirical work has found that the most seriously injured plaintiffs col-
lect a smaller proportion of their economic losses than do those with less
serious injuries. 35 Several aspects of the tort system are thought to lead
to this result, including the fact that defendants and their insurers have a
greater incentive to invest in contesting large claims, as well as the possi-
bility that the full costs of major injuries may be more difficult to assess
until well after the injury occurs. 36
A related problem is that not all persons who are eligible to sue do
so. In a massive national survey of the filing of lawsuits, the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice found that claims for compensation were made
for only about 10 percent of accidental injuries. 37 Another study found
that only 5 percent of persons who believe that their injury might have
been caused by another person actually file suit in court.38 Based on
these studies, scholars suggest that a significant number of potential
plaintiffs with valid claims never sue.39 To the extent that these esti-
Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 161-62 (1986) (estimat-
ing one percent to twelve percent of tort trials filed go to the jury).
32 See Saks, supra note 27, at 1213.
33 STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUB. No. NCJ-153177,
TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 1991-92 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/
ascii/tcilc.txt.
34 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY: CIVIL JUSTICE
ROUNDTABLE 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjrd.pdf.
35 See D. DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 422-23 (1996)
(noting how jurors tend to undercompensate for the severest injuries); Galanter, supra note 1,
at 1116-20 (reviewing the empirical evidence on undercompensation).
36 Galanter, supra note 1, at 1120.
37 DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTIrTrT FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1991). Claims were made for 44 percent of
motor vehicle claims, 7 percent of work injuries, and 3 percent of other injuries. Id. at 121.
38 Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims & Disputes: Assessing the Ad-
versary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 525, 544 (1980-81). This study found that of every
one thousand events for which an injury was noticed, 718 became claims in which the victim
brought the problem to the alleged harm doer, 103 were brought to the attention of a lawyer,
and 50 became filed cases. Id.
39 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 1, at 1102-03 (noting Richard Abel's conclusion that
"the tort system suffers from a chronic 'crisis of underclaiming"'); Merritt & Barry, supra note
25, at 385 ("Researchers repeatedly have shown that the majority of individuals injured by
negligent conduct-whether medical malpractice, flawed manufacturing processes, or other
actions-never file a legal complaint."); Saks, supra note 27, at 1185 ("[T]hese studies suggest
that ... a large number of potential plaintiffs never initiate a claim .... ").
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mates accurately reflect behavior in product liability actions, estimates of
external costs based on settlement and trial awards will be too low.
3. Third-Party Payments
A final problem with using existing data on pre-trial and trial
awards is that persons or entities other than plaintiffs pay for external
costs associated with dangerous products. We could not find data indi-
cating the full extent of such third-party payments across the full spec-
trum of tort cases. The Department of Transportation (DOT), however,
has published data (see Table 3) indicating the proportion of costs associ-
ated with motor vehicle accidents that are borne by third parties.40 The
DOT data presumably include the cost of injuries (or fatalities) due to
defective automobiles and trucks, but there is no separate estimate of
these externalities.
TABLE 3: INJURY COSTS IN 2000, ESTIMATED SOURCE OF PAYMENT BY
COST CATEGORY
(Percent of Total Cost)
Federal State Total Insurer Other Self Total
Medical 14.4 9.8 24.2 54.9 6.4 14.6 100
Emergency 3.9 75.8 79.6 14.7 1.7 3.9 100
Services
Market 16.2 3.1 19.3 41.1 1.6 38.1 100
Productivity
Household - - 0.0 41.1 1.6 57.4 100
Productivity
InsuranceInsratio 0.9 0.5 1.4 98.6 - - 100AdministrationI
Legal/Court - - - 100.0 - - 100
Travel Delay 100.0 - 100
Property 65.0 35.0 100
Damage
There are four primary sources of third-party payments for the ex-
ternal costs of dangerous products: private insurance, government pro-
grams, the business community, and the families of tort victims. The
common law collateral source rule and subrogation rights determine the
extent to which private insurance and government programs pay for ex-
ternal costs. While studies commonly recognize payments by private in-
40 See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADmm., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., THE Eco-
NOMIC IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRAsHEs 2000 59 tbl.22 (2002), available at http:ll
lhsc.Isu.edu/OutsideLinks/Economioclmpact- 1 .pdf.
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surance, government programs, and the business community, studies
generally overlook payments by family members. The DOT data, for
example, do not include this category, as Table 3 indicates.
a. Private Insurance
A person injured by a dangerous product who has private insurance
may receive reimbursement of his or her costs from health insurance and
disability insurance. However, nearly 40 million Americans have no
health insurance. 41 Another category of insurance is general-purpose life
insurance that covers death resulting from accidents.
b. Government Programs
Persons injured by dangerous products may also become eligible for
cash or in-kind assistance from a multitude of government programs, in-
cluding unemployment compensation, food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare,
State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF), Social Security Disability, and Old
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance. There may also be costs to
Veterans Affairs for use of military hospitals and clinics.
Less proximate costs might arise when affected families may need
more community services such as emergency calls, ambulance services,
tutoring programs, job training programs, and rehabilitation services.
These families may also require community resources such as special
programs for children, special programs for persons with disabilities,
counseling services, and local social services and mental health services.
Local school systems may experience an increase in their special educa-
tion expenses, which may significantly increase with the addition of even
one special education child.
c. Collateral Source Rule
Relatively often, people injured by dangerous products do not file
law suits. 42 One likely reason is that private insurance reimburses them
for their expenses. Similarly, people may not sue because they receive
assistance from government safety net programs. When they do file a
lawsuit, the collateral source rule and subrogation rights determine the
extent to which private insurance companies and some government pro-
grams ultimately pay for external costs of dangerous products.
41 NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NUMBER AND PERCENT OF PERSONS WITHOUT
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, By AGE GROUP: UNITED STATES, 1997 - QUARTER ONE
2002 tbl.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhis/released2002O9/
tableOl 1 .htm (indicating that 39.7 million persons lacked health insurance as of the first quar-
ter of 2002, the most recent data available).
42 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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The common law collateral source rule permits plaintiffs to recover
from defendants sums that a third party, such as an insurance company or
government program, has already paid to the plaintiff.43 In this circum-
stance, however, a third party can recover the cost of those payments if
the third party has a contractual or statutory right of subrogation.44 In
cases where an insurer has subrogation rights, a plaintiff may not be able
to keep any compensation from a tort award or cash payment settlement
if the amount collected from the defendant is less than the amount the
person received from his or her insurance company. Subrogation rights
may also discourage a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit in the first place,
where the recovery is likely to fall short of the plaintiff's expenses. 45 In
the twenty-three states that have abolished or changed the common law
collateral source rule,46 manufacturers of dangerous products are relieved
of the obligation to pay for part or all of the costs that they have created
because those costs have been or will be paid by private insurance or
government programs. 47
d. Business Community
The business community also bears some of the external costs of
dangerous products. First, there are costs to the manufacturer of a dan-
gerous product other than the payment of compensation through the tort
system. Companies lose money from recalls, poor public relations and
bad press, and from the need to redesign a product to avoid earlier
hazards.48 Many corporate annual reports take note of these effects in
their financial analysis. Second, there are indirect costs that other firms
must bear. For example, a company employing a person injured or killed
by a dangerous product loses his or her services for a time or perma-
nently. Less obviously, firms employing the family members of a victim
may also lose the services of family members for a time or permanently.
43 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and
Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 75, 95 (1993).
44 Private insurers contract for a right of subrogation except for life insurance companies.
See id. at 96. Congress has likewise established a right of subrogation for Medicaid and Medi-
care by statute. See 42 U.S.C. §1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). The extent to which local and state
programs have similar provisions is unknown.
45 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (noting that many persons injured as a
result of a tort do not file a lawsuit).
46 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM THE STATES 6 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/
Report.pdf.
47 See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 43, at 96. In states that have modified the rule,
the result will be the same to the extent that third parties ultimately pay for external costs.
48 See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Peanut Corporation of America to Liquidate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2009, at B2; Natasha Singer, FDA Finds "Natural" Diet Pills Laced with Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009 at B 1.
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Such firms may incur costs from locating and training replacements, or
may experience reduced productivity of those family members due to
dislocations at home.
e. Family Members
Families and family members may suffer a wide variety of costs
that arise from an injury, illness, or death resulting from the use of a
dangerous product. A family member, for example, may become an un-
paid caretaker to a seriously injured individual, thus foregoing earned
income. Or, because of the financial strain on a family, children may
have to cut their education short, resulting in decreased lifetime earnings.
II. METHODOLOGY
The external costs of dangerous products can be estimated from cur-
rent data sources, but each measure of externalities has its own limita-
tions and defects. In light of these problems, we have developed a new
methodology to estimate these costs. This part identifies and explains
the basic building blocks of our methodology: case studies, synthetic co-
horts, cost of injury measurements, and hypothetical scenarios. Each of
the case studies further explains the methodology. Readers who wish to
see the details of our calculations can consult the on-line database. 49
A. Case Studies
We estimate the external costs attributable to three widely sold dan-
gerous products: Ford SUVs with Firestone tires, the pharmaceutical
drug Baycol, and All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) with three wheels. Our
choice of these three dangerous products was based on the availability of
injury and fatality data; more comprehensive data were available for the
three chosen dangerous products in comparison to other such products.
The choice of products may have affected the results of the study, but we
believe that the selected products produce injuries and fatalities that are
representative of the range of consequences and outcomes that those dan-
gerous products might cause in a mass consumer society.
B. Synthetic Cohorts
Producing an estimate of the external costs of dangerous products
requires demographic information about the tort victims, such as their
age and gender, as well as injury information specifying the part of the
body that was injured, the medical classification of that injury, and what
treatment, therapy, and drugs the patient required. To obtain the neces-
sary information, we searched legal opinions, public databases, articles
49 See "CO1 Methodology Appendix," available at http://users.wfu.edu/shapirsa/.
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published in the scholarly and popular legal, economic, and medical liter-
ature, and newspaper articles. We also spoke with attorneys familiar with
the relevant product defects. These efforts did not produce the detailed
demographic information required for our cost studies.
To bridge this gap, we created synthetic cohorts of victims. The
synthetic cohort technique is an established method in medicine and eco-
nomics, which researchers use to estimate effects and outcomes when
demographic and other necessary data are not available. 50 It is heavily
relied on as the method of choice for investigating the cost-effectiveness
of pharmaceuticals.5 1 We generated our cohorts after a thorough review
of the existing literature and discussions with lawyers involved in litiga-
tion concerning the products we study. These synthetic cohorts represent
our best judgments regarding the demographics, injury, and medical
characteristics.
C. Cost-of-Injury Measurements
The use of the synthetic cohort method in medicine and economics
is typically conducted with the use of the cost-of-illness or cost-of-injury
(COI) approach,52 which we also adopt. This combined methodology
divides costs into two categories: direct and indirect costs. In the sim-
plest version, direct costs include only medical expenses and indirect
costs include only lost earnings. 53 Medical costs include hospital bills,
doctor visits, medical tests, rehabilitation, and drug costs. Lost earnings
measure the dollar value of the lost work-time that results from injury or
illness. 54 This measurement of lost earnings is sometimes referred to as
the "human capital" technique. 55 More elaborate versions of COI in-
clude such additional direct costs as the cost of administrating medical
insurance, and such indirect costs as the dollar value of lost production in
the household and lost fringe benefits. 56 Household production would
50 See, e.g., Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Jonathan A. Parker, Consumption over the Life
Cycle, 70 ECONOMETRICA 47, 47 (2002); Anna Peeters et al., A Cardiovascular Life History -
A Life Course Analysis of the Original Framingham Heart Study Cohort, 23 EUROPEAN
HEALTH J. 458, 459 (2002).
51 See, e.g., Brian F. Gage et al., Cost-effectiveness of Warfarin and Aspirin for Prophy-
laxis of Stroke in Patients with Nonvalvular Atrial Fibrillation, 274 J. Am. MED. Assoc. 1839,
1839 (1995); MARTHE R. GOLD ET AL., COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 18
(1996).
52 See PETER MUENNING, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
IN MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE ch. 7 (2002).
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include, for example, the costs of preparing meals, childcare, and clean-
ing; fringe benefits would include medical insurance. 57
To calculate direct costs, we measured the total medical costs of
persons injured or killed as the result of using one of the three products
we studied. To calculate indirect costs, we measured the cost of lost
wages, lost fringe benefits, and the lost value of home production. All
traditional costs are expressed in 2007 dollars.
Although trial awards are a starting point for calculating costs, these
awards may or may not fully compensate a tort victim. 5 8 In comparison,
our calculations include 100 percent of medical costs and lost wages. As
noted, we also included estimates of the lost economic value of home
production, values which appear to be excluded from tort awards at least
some of the time.59 Finally, in contrast to the tort system, the traditional
COI method typically does not estimate pain and suffering because the
difficulty of monetizing its value due to the lack of market evidence of
value, and we adhere to this approach.
We also applied COI methodology to develop estimates of costs not
normally included by COI methodology, which we term "extended
costs." In our approach, "extended" costs include any external cost that
results from an injury or fatality caused by a dangerous product other
than the direct and indirect costs considered in traditional COI measure-
ments (i.e., the medical costs of persons injured by a dangerous product
and that person's lost wages, lost fringe benefits, and the lost value of
home production). Such costs may be less proximate in time, but never-
theless are attributable to the dangerous product injury or fatality. For
example, the cost of caregiving provided by a spouse for a partner in-
jured by a dangerous product would be an extended cost that we would
include. 60 All extended costs are expressed in 2007 dollars, discounted
at 3 percent, with no adjustment for future inflation.
D. Hypothetical Scenarios
Although we have sought to measure extended costs, there is little
available information about the distribution of extended costs for the
three dangerous products that we studied. For example, the cost of
caregiving provided by a spouse for a partner rendered a permanent
57 See id.
58 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
59 See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation, Family Law and the Romance of Eco-
nomics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 989, 1023 (1995) (discussing the exclusion of home produc-
tion in tort awards).
60 See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. When a person ' ,as injured and the
family chose to hire someone for caregiving, the cost measured the average amount paid. On
the other hand, if a family member quit his or her job to undertake the caregiving, we mea-
sured the cost as foregone earnings.
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quadriplegic in an SUV rollover is an extended cost. However, we do
not know how many persons injured as a result of an SUV rollover were
injured in this manner and how frequently the care of such persons in-
volved caregiving by a spouse.
To address this limitation, we created three hypothetical scenarios
of potential extended costs for each cost study, then estimated the ex-
tended costs identified in each scenario using published data. Although
we must use hypothetical examples, we still believe our methodology is
an improvement over existing efforts to measure external costs. This
extension is necessary to develop a more complete picture of external
costs due to the likelihood of public agencies, the business community,
and family members bearing significant extended costs. In fact, these
costs may be greater than the costs measured by the traditional COI
methodology, as we will demonstrate. 6'
III. FoRDfFIRESTONE ROLLOVERS
The first case study determines the social costs associated with the
rollover of the Ford Explorer model SUV equipped with Firestone tires.
We describe the product defect that made these automobiles a dangerous
product. We then detail how we derived our estimates of traditional COI
external costs, which total almost $555 million, and our estimates of ex-
tended costs, which total between $733,000 and $2.55 million per family.
We conclude with a discussion of the results.
A. Product Defect
The Ford Explorer model SUV, which Ford first produced in 1991,
had suspension problems due to its high center of gravity. 62 These
problems created "significant handling and stability defects" and the
"substantial risk of rollovers. ' '63 To remedy these design flaws, Ford rec-
ommended that tires on Explorers be kept at 26 pounds per square inch
(psi) in order to decrease the distance between the weight of the car and
the ground. 64 Since the tires had been designed for 30 psi,65 Ford essen-
tially was recommending that owners substantially under-inflate their
tires.
61 See infra Conclusion, tbl.19 (comparing traditional and extended costs).
62 See In re Ford Motor Co. Securities Litigation, 184 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
63 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products, 155 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1077 (S.D. Ind.
2001).
64 See In re Ford, 184 F.Supp.2d at 629.
65 Jamie Butters, Tire Pressure Alert is Promised for Fall Also On the Horizon: Side
Airbags, New Brakes, DETROrr FREE PREss, Jan. 10, 2001, at 1E.
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The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had
classified the Firestone ATX tire, which came on the Ford Explorer as
standard equipment, as having the lowest heat/temperature rating al-
lowed to be sold under the agency's Uniform Tire Quality Grading Sys-
tem.66 Tires with this rating are unable to resist heat-buildup to the same
degree as higher quality tires. This flaw proved even worse for consum-
ers, since the NHTSA grades tires under controlled laboratory condi-
tions, which assume that tires are properly inflated. 67 As a result, Ford's
recommendation that owners keep the ATX tires at reduced pressures
resulted in significantly higher percentage of tire failure than government
tests would have predicted. 68
Consumers in the United States began filing claims based on
problems with Firestone tires on Ford Explorers as early as 1993.69 Sub-
sequently, Firestone redesigned the "ATX" tire twice, once in 1995, re-
leasing its "ATX II" model tire, and again in 1996, releasing the
"Wilderness AT" tire. 70 In 1996, Firestone received a growing number
of complaints regarding all three models of tires. Most of these com-
plaints alleged problems with tread separation,71 a problem that increases
the likelihood that a driver may lose complete control of an Explorer,
particularly during significant braking or steering. 72 In response, Ford
recommended that drivers increase the tire pressure for their vehicles,
forcing consumers to choose between the risk of tread separation or of a
rollover.73
After a Houston television station aired a special report regarding
fatalities and Firestone tires in February 2000, NHTSA launched an in-
66 In re Ford, 184 F.Supp.2d at 269; see Terril Yue Jones & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar,
Low Heat Rating Found in Tires on Ford SUVs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2000, at Al.
67 See 49 C.F.R. § 575.104, tbl. 1.
68 In re Ford Motor Co. Securities Litigation, 184 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (E.D. Mich.
2001). ATX tires had a failure rate of 60 to 200 per million tires, while the average failure rate
of tires from other manufacturers was less than five per million tires. Keith Bradsher, Ford
Intends to Replace 13 Million Firestone Wilderness Tires, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at Cl.
69 Erica McCallum, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Will the Early Warning
Reporting Required by the TREAD Act Uncover Deadly Defects Soon Enough?, 44 ARIZ. L.
REv. 939, 944 (2002).
70 Kevin M. McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me: Faster Than a Tire Blowout, Congress
Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation That Treads on the Thirty-Five Year Old Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 49 BuFF. L. RaV. 1163, 1172 (2001) [hereinafter McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me].
71 Id. Tread separation occurs when the outer steel belt and tread of the tire separate
from the tire and become completely detached. Henry v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 63
Fed.App'x 953, 956 (7th Cir. 2003).
72 In re Ford, 184 F.Supp.2d at 269; Henry, 63 Fed.App'x at 956.
73 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products, 155 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1080 (S.D. Ind.
2001).
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vestigation. 74 Firestone responded by announcing a voluntary recall of
all ATX and ATX II tires that had been manufactured since 1991. 75
B. Traditional COI Costs
According to news reports, between 271 and 476 people died as a
result of the Ford SUV rollovers in the United States, and there were
over 800 serious injuries.76 News reports also indicate that Ford settled
approximately 1,500 Explorer-related cases and Firestone settled more
than 1,300 lawsuits. 77 Based on these figures, we estimated traditional
COI costs.
Since we could not verify the news reports of the number of fatali-
ties, we adopted the most conservative approach and chose 271 deaths,
the low end of the available estimates. In comparison, we assumed that
the reports of over 800 non-fatal injuries captured only some of these
injuries, for two reasons. First, it is not cost-effective for tort lawyers to
take cases involving only a small amount of damages, which means the
number of serious injuries does not reflect the total number of injuries.
Second, the work by Finkelstein and his collaborators indicates that there
are far more injuries from accidents that involve no hospital visit than
injuries that require hospitalization. 78
To estimate the number of non-fatal injuries involving hospitaliza-
tion, we calculated ratios of hospitalized injuries to fatal injuries based
on data from Finkelstein's work which indicated by age group and sex
the number of motor vehicle accidents that resulted in hospitalizations as
compared to the number of fatalities for the same age groups and sex. 79
We used a similar methodology to estimate the number of injuries not
requiring hospitalization based on data from the same source. We calcu-
lated ratios of non-hospitalized injuries to fatal injuries from data that
indicated by age group and sex the number of motor vehicle accidents
74 McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me, supra note 70, at 1172-73. Firestone did not com-
ply with NHTSA recommendation to expand the recall to the "Wilderness AT" model tire, but
agreed to replace those tires on a case by case basis. Ford, however, agreed to a recall to
replace all "Wilderness AT" tires on Explorers with a different brand of tire. Id. at 1173-74.
75 Id. at 1173.
76 See Kevin M. McDonald, Separations, Blow-Outs, and Fallout: A TREADise on the
Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-Firestone Tire Recall, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1073, 1079
(2004) [hereinafter McDonald, Separations, Blow-Outs, and Fallout]; Jon S. Vemick et al.,
Role of Litigation in Preventing Product-Related Injuries, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 90, 92
(2003).
77 McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me, supra note 70, at 1078.
78 See FN I_ srE'N Er AL., supra note 8, at 48 Appendix 1.4 (indicating number of motor
vehicle accidents resulting in fatalities, hospitalization, and no hospitalization by age, group,
and sex).
79 See id. (indicating number of motor vehicle accidents resulting in fatalities and hospi-
talization by age group and sex).
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that did not result in hospitalizations and the number of fatalities for the
same age groups and sex. 80
We assumed gender and age compositions to be the same as those
for all motor vehicle crash deaths in the Fatal Accident Reporting System
from NHTSA. 8' Table 4 presents the results by gender, age, and the
nature of injuries suffered in each gender and age category. The first row
of the second column contains the number 0.2077, meaning that men
who are 20 years old or younger comprised 20.77 percent of all injuries
to men and women in our synthetic cohort. The sum of the percentages in
the second column and the sixth column equals 100 percent. The num-
ber 56 in the first row of the third column represents the estimated num-
ber of men who are 20 years old or younger who died as the result of a
Ford-Firestone rollover. The numbers 307 and 5,375 represent the num-
ber of men who are 20 years old or younger who were hospitalized and
who were not hospitalized as a result of their injuries, respectively.
TABLE 4: FORD-FIRESTONE COHORT NUMBERS
Men Women
Percent Number of Percent Number ofAge of all Fatal Non - of all Fatal Non -
injuries injuries Hospital Hospital injuries injuries H Ita l Hospital
20 0.2077 56 307 5,375 0.1023 28 151 2,647
40 0.2211 60 327 5,722 0.1089 30 161 2,818
60 0.2412 65 357 6,239 0.1188 32 176 3,074
The next step was to match medical costs and lost production to this
distribution of fatalities, hospitalized, and non-hospitalized injuries. The
data for direct and indirect COl costs were drawn from Finkelstein and
his colleagues, who compiled this information to estimate the total cost
of injuries in the United States. 82 We multiplied the number of injuries
identified in Table 4 by these per-person costs to generate total costs.
The costs were adjusted to reflect the value of the dollar in the year 2007.
These results are presented in Table 5.
80 See id. (indicating number of motor vehicle accidents resulting in fatalities and no
hospitalization by age group and sex).
81 Fatality Analysis Report System Encyclopedia (FARS), available at http://www-
fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx.
82 See FINKEL.STEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 56, 97.
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TABLE 5: FORD-FIRESTONE COI ACROSS AGE AND GENDER
Age Medical Lost Production Total
Men
20 $17,748,443 $130,544,249 $148,292,692
40 $17,155,266 $136,055,456 $153,210,722
60 $19,645,879 $96,133,696 $115,779,574
Sub-total, Men $54,549,588.08 $362,733,401 $417,282,989
Women
20 $7,463,776 $40,523,454 $47,987,230
40 $7,272,527 $42,991,472 $50,263,999
60 $8,317,103 $30,994,466 $39,311,569
Sub-total, Women 1 $23,053,407 $114,509,392 $137,562,798
Total $554,845,787
C. Extended Costs
In this section, we describe three possible scenarios involving ex-
tended external costs caused by an SUV rollover and explain our meth-
odology for estimating those hypothetical costs. These scenarios
produce extended costs ranging from $288,000 to $2.4 million per
family.
1. Permanent Quadriplegia
The first scenario assumes that a man, age forty-six, with two chil-
dren who are sixteen and eighteen years old, suffers permanent
quadriplegia as a result of a Ford-Firestone rollover. His wife, age forty-
six, falls back to part-time employment to care for her husband, and the
older child drops out of college to take on dual work and caregiving
roles. After two years, the family loses one car and its home, prompting
them to file for bankruptcy, a relatively common occurrence in this situa-
tion. 83 The younger child graduates from high school, but foregoes a
college education and immediately enters the work force. In addition,
the employers of family members bear the costs of lost productivity due
to caregiving burdens. Table 6 summarizes the extended costs associated
with these circumstances, which total $740,454, discounted at 3 percent,
and without taking into account any future inflation.
83 The assumption of bankruptcy is based on data indicating that approximately 50 per-
cent of bankruptcies in families relate to medical events. See David U. Himmelstein et al.,
MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 24 HEALTH Avi. (WEB Ex-
CLUSIVE) W5-63, W5-66-67 (2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w5.63vi.
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TABLE 6: FORD-FIRESTONE EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO ONE
Costs Amount
Caregiving $115,165
Two children: No college $401,124
Lost equity in home $108,000
Lost vacation $23,080
Lost Social Security $27,216
Lost productivity to employers of family members $65,869
TOTAL $740,454
We estimated the value of the spouse's caregiving based on pub-
lished data providing the value of informal caregiving per hour,84 and the
average out-of-pocket cash outlays by such caregivers. 85 The cost to the
children of foregoing a college education is based on data from the De-
partment of Labor comparing median earnings of college and high school
graduates. 86 The lost equity calculation assumes the victim lived in a
$200,000 home and had the average amount of equity that individuals in
the United States have as measured by their ownership interest. 87 Two
weeks of lost vacation per year for twenty years is valued on the basis of
the annual $30,000 compensation of the husband prior to the accident.
The husband's lost Social Security payments are calculated using work-
sheets provided by the Social Security Administration. 88 We assumed no
benefits for the wife or children. The value of lost productivity to the
employers of family members was based on data indicating the average
cost of decreased productivity of workers caring for disabled family
members. 89
84 See MARY Jo GIBSON & Ali N. HOUSER, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INST., IssuE BRIEF:
VALUING THE INVALUABLE: A NEW LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF FAMILY CAREGIVING 3
(2007), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/ib82_caregiving.pdf (calculating the value
of informal caregiving as $10,400 per year).
85 See id. at 4 (indicating that family and friends who are caregivers spend an estimated
$2,400 per year for groceries, medicine, and other out of-pocket cash outlays for the care
recipient).
86 See Theresa Cosca, Earnings of College Graduates in 1996, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
Q., Fall 1998 (indicating persons with a high school degree earn 36 percent less than persons
with a Bachelor's degree). This estimate does not take into account how much money the
children saved by not attending college.
87 See ALAN GREENSPAN & JAMES KENNEDY, SOURCES AND USES OF EQUITY Ex-
TRACTED FROM HoMEs 27 (Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series
No. 2007-20, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200720/
200720pap.pdf.
88 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., YOUR RETIREMENT BENEFIT: How IT Is FIGURED, SSA PUBLICA-
TION No. 05-10070 (2008), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10070.pdf.
89 See Walter F. Steward et al., Cost of Lost Productive Work Time Among US Workers
with Depression, 289 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 3135, 3135 (2003) (indicating an average cost of
$3,600 per year).
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2. Multiple Family Injuries Including Child in Persistent
Vegetative State
In our second scenario, a rollover results in the death of a grand-
mother, injuries to a mother and father, and injuries to their two children.
The older child, age ten, has several broken bones and the younger child,
age eight, is left in a persistent vegetative state. Because the grandfather
is unable to live alone, he must move into an assisted living facility. An
aunt cares for the older child in her home for two months, and then
moves in with the family for six months to provide support while the
parents get back on their feet. Due to her injuries (an arm amputation
and facial scarring), the mother, age thirty-eight, loses her job and cannot
find a new one for two years, eventually settling on a position paying less
than one-half as much as her prior position. She becomes clinically de-
pressed and requires psychotherapy for eight years. The family attempts
to care for the disabled child at home, but after two years the father
becomes unable to cope with the constant stress and abandons the family.
This forces the mother and older son to move to subsidized housing for
six years and to rely on TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid. With the
mother's agreement, after the abandonment, the comatose son becomes a
ward of the state for the remaining twenty-eight years of his life. This
step was necessary because the mother lacked the financial resources to
care for the child. Table 7 summarizes the extended costs associated
with this scenario, which total $1,476,136 in 2007 dollars, discounted at
3% and without taking into account future inflation.
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TABLE 7: FORD-FIRESTONE EXTEND COSTS-SCENARIO Two
Family Public Sector
Airfare $4,920 -
Funral es Hotel and per diem $10,890 -
Grandmother
Funeral costs $7,323
Grandfather Assisted living $256,106 -
Hosting old son $927 -
Aunt Related household $1,200-
costs
Leave without pay $25,000 -
Subsidized housing - $36,199
Mother and TANF - $26,296
Older Son Food Stamps - $5,809
Medicaid - $22,893








Disabled Son Medicaid prescription - $1,954
Physical therapy $50,999 -




We assumed that fifteen family members traveled to the grand-
mother's funeral incurring average travel expenses.90 Funeral costs like-
wise reflect average costs. 9' The cost of assisted living for the
grandfather is based on insurance company data.92 The aunt's cost of
90 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Transp., Average Third-Quarter Air Fares Fell 0.8
Percent from 2006 (January 30, 2008), available at http://www.bts.gov/pressreleases/2008/
bts00508/pdf/bts00508.pdf.
91 See Press Release, National Funeral Directors Association, NFDA Releases Results of
General Price List Survey (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.nfda.org/pressRelease.php
?elD=293 (indicating the median national cost of funerals in 2006 was $7,323).
92 See Press Release, MetLife Mature Market Inst., Private and Semi-Private Nursing
Home Room Rates Increase 3% in 2007 Assisted Living Rates Remain Steady, According to
MetLife Market Survey, Oct. 30, 2007, available at http:llwww.metlife.conlassets/cao/mmil
publications/mmi-pressroommmi-pressreeases-nursing-home-asst-living-2007L.pdf?SCOPE
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hosting the oldest son uses U.S. Census data on the weekly cost of rais-
ing a child,93 and her costs of taking care of the family are based on
average household costs. 94 We assume that she took a leave without pay
from her job, losing $25,000 in lost income. The costs to the public
sector of providing subsidized housing, 95 TANF,9 6 food stamps,97 and
Medicaid 98 were derived from government data and our assumptions
about the duration of these benefits as indicated in the footnotes. The
cost of unemployment insurance for the mother is based on the 2006
national average. 99 For her lost income, we assumed that she earned
$24,000 after the accident compared to $50,000 prior to the accident.' 00
The cost of her psychotherapy is based on a national average cost. to
Likewise, the disabled son's costs for attendant services (two shifts per
=Metlife&MSHiC=65001 &L= 1 0&W=2007%203%2OHome%20Increase%2ONursing%20
Private%20Rates%20Room%20SemiPrivate%20and%20in%20&Pre=%3CFONT%20STYLE
%3D%22background%3A%23ffffOO%22%3E&Post=%3C/FONT%3E (indicating a monthly
cost for assisted living of $2,969/month) [hereinafter MetLife Press Release].
93 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WEEKLY CHILD CARE COSTS PAID BY FAMILIES WITH EM-
PLOYED MOTHERS: 1985-2005 tbl.C2 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
www/socdemo/child/weeklychldcare.xls (indicating cost per week of $107).
94 See GIBSON & HOUSER, supra note 84, at 4 (indicating that family and friends who are
caregivers spend an estimated $2,400 per year for groceries, medicine, and other out-of-pocket
cash outlays for the care recipient).
95 See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ISSUE BRIEF No. II: ECONOMIC COST ANAL-
YSIS OF DIFFERENT FoRcMs OF ASSISTED HOUSING (1998), available at http://www.huduser.org/
publications/pdf/economic.pdf (indicating the average operating cost of single room occu-
pancy for Section 8 housing is $298 per month).
96 See OFFICE OF POLICY & OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION & STATISTICS, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2005
9.14-15 tbl.9.G (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/
2005/9g.pdf (indicating cost of TANF benefits). We assume the mother and son were eligible
for TANF for one year.
97 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: How
MUCH COULD I RECEIVE?, available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/applicantrecipients/
BEN.HTM (indicating food stamps cost the government a maximum rate of $298 for a family
of two for FY2008 and a maximum of $162 for one person). Our calculation uses the mini-
mum amount of food stamp benefits available from the government. The maximum amount of
food stamps is three times as much. Our estimate assumes that two members of the family
received food stamps for six years and one member of the family received food stamps for
twenty-five years.
98 See OFFICE OF POLICY & OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION & STATISTICS, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2006, 58
(2007), available at http:l/www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2006/
supplement06.pdf (indicating that Medicaid per person is $2,215 per year, on average) [herein-
after 2006 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT]. We assumed Medicaid for two people for six years and
for one person for twenty-five years.
99 2006 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 98, at 6 (indicating a $266.60 average
weekly benefit, for 15.3 weeks).
100 Our calculation does not take into account any loss of benefits and subtracts the unem-
ployment compensation that she received.
101 See ERWIN BROWN, JR. & KAREN BEAUREGARD, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH
& QUALITY, STATISTICAL BRIEF No. 157: REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN TOTAL AND
OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES FOR SELECTED TYPES OF OFFICE-BASED VISITS, 2004 1
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day for two years), 10 2 physical therapy (one hour daily for two years), 0 3
Medicaid,' 04 and a nursing home,' 0 5 are based on data indicating the
average or reimbursable cost of these services and on our conservative
assumptions about their duration.
3. Woman Suffering Serious Mental Illness
In the final scenario, a woman becomes mentally ill after her hus-
band and two children die in a rollover crash and fails to recover. She is
40 years old and must be institutionalized for the remaining 40 years of
her life.' 0 6 For that period, the economic cost from this single rollover
event is $2,554,783 in 2007 dollars, discounted 3 percent over 40
years.'0 7 This estimate does not account for any inflation in the cost of
her institutionalized care.
D. Discussion
Our estimate of the number of fatalities is based on news reports
indicating between 271 and 476 persons died as the result of Ford SUV
rollovers.108 Since we chose the low end of this estimate, our calculation
of traditional COI costs may understate actual costs. Our calculation of
COI costs concerning injuries requiring hospitalization and not requiring
(2007), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/datafiles/publications/st157/
statl57.pdf (indicating average hourly cost of $106.08).
102 See METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST. & LIFEPLANS, INC., THE METLIFE MARKET SURVEY
OF ADULT DAY SERVICES & HOME CARE COSTS 4 (2007), available at http://
www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/mmi-studies-2007-adult-day-services-
and-study.pdf (indicating national average hourly cost of $19) [hereinafter METLrFE MARKET
SURVEY].
t03 See TOM SUEHS & PAM McDONALD, TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N,
PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE COMMITrEE ON HUMAN SERVICES 19 (Mar. 13, 2008), available
at http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/news/presentations/0308HHSCPresentation.pdf (indicating a
cost/recommended rate of $77.65 per hour for SFY04-05).
104 See 2006 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 98, at 5 (indicating average vendor
payment of $23,882 for nursing facility services in 2003).
105 See THE NAT'L SPINAL CORD INJURY STATISTICAL CTR., UNIV. OF ALA. AT BIRMING-
HAM, SPINAL CORD INJURY: FACTS AND FIGURES AT A GLANCE 2 (2006), available at http://
images.main.uab.edu/spinalcord/pdffiles/Facts06.pdf (finding that an individual injured at age
20 who survived at least a year and remained ventilator dependent at any level, had a life
expectancy of 23.3 years).
106 See HSIANG-CHING KUNG, PH.D. ET AL, CDC, DIVISION OF VITAL STATISTICS, NA-
TIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2005 7, available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalnvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_10.pdf (showing life expectancy for females in
the United States at 80.4 years).
107 See Hous. DIV., WASH. STATE DEP'T OF COMTY., TRADE AND ECON. DEV., TEN-YEAR
HOMELESS PLAN 15 (2006) (indicating that the cost per day for institutionalized care in a
mental hospital in the state of Washington is $555, or $202,575 per year), available at http://
cted.wa.gov/.CTED/documents/ID_3356_Publications.doc.
108 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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hospitalization may likewise understate actual costs because we extrapo-
lated these estimates from our estimate of the number of fatalities.' 0 9
We assumed that the gender and age compositions for all motor
vehicle crash deaths as indicated by NHTSA data were representative of
the gender and age compositions for gender and age compositions for
Ford rollover injuries and fatalities. 110 Because the accidents we studied
involved SUVs, there may be more women and children involved than in
the average crash. 1 However, we were unable to locate data that would
permit us to fine-tune our gender and age compositions.
The per-injury medical cost for fatalities for all ages ranged from
$5,910 to $8,755 for males and from $6,800 to $10,072 for females." 12
If anything, these results appear to underestimate the costs associated
with a fatality. Zaloshnja and Miller indicate that a fatal vehicle crash
entails medical costs of $20,655, and this estimate assumes instant death,
rather than the costlier outcome of critical injuries causing death weeks
later.1 13
Our per-injury estimate of medical costs and indirect costs for fatali-
ties ranges from $448,581 to $1,409,627.114 Department of Transporta-
tion data suggests these estimates are generally accurate, if one assumes
that Firestone/Ford rollover accidents were at least as severe as other
motor vehicle accidents. According to DOT, each motor vehicle fatality
entails an average discounted lifetime cost of $977,000 and each criti-
cally injured survivor represents costs averaging $1.1 million.1 15
Our estimate of traditional costs includes minor injuries, which we
defined as injuries not involving hospitalization. Presumably persons
with relatively minor injuries did not sue Ford or Firestone, particularly
if the cost of their injuries was covered by medical insurance. We incor-
porated the cost of treatment for these minor injuries into traditional
109 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
I Il See Jack Hitt, The Hidden Life of SUVs, MOTHER JONES, July/August 1999, available
at http://4wheeldrive.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi= 1/XJ&sdn=4wheeldrive&cdn=au-
tos&tm=14&gps=132_94_1020_622&f=00&su=p706.15.336.ip_&tt=2&bt=l&bts=0&st=16&
zu=http%3A//www.motherjones.com/motherjones/JA99/rant.html (stating that 40 percent of
all SUV sales are to women, and the proportion is growing); Public Citizen, Hazards of SUVs
for Children, available at http://www.citizen.org/autosafety/boosterseat/childmsuv/index.cfm.
112 COI Methodology Appendix, supra note 49, at 8.
113 See Eduard Zaloshnja et al., Crash Costs in the United States by Crash Geometry, 38
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 644 (2006).
114 To derive these figures, we added the per-injury medical costs and per-injury indirect
costs for males, ages 20, 40, and 60, and for females, ages 20, 40, and 60. The lowest com-
bined cost is for females, age 60, and the highest combined cost is for males, age 20. See COI
Methodology Appendix, supra note 49, at 8, 11.
115 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 1 (2000), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Pubs/809446.PDF.
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costs to produce a more accurate estimate of CO. On the other hand, we
do not include the cost of the property damage to the vehicles that were
in the rollovers, costs which are presumably paid for by a person's auto-
mobile insurance. Once again, this omission suggests that our estimates
of COI understate true social costs.
Our estimate that the SUV accidents involved almost $555 million
in direct costs, excluding-pain and suffering, gains credence from corre-
lating figures in published reports, which indicate that Ford was defend-
ing over $590 million in personal injury and class action lawsuits, and
that Firestone had set aside $800 million for lawsuits relating to the ATX
and ATX II tires. 116 Assuming the accuracy of these newspaper reports,
they suggest that our estimates understate COI. This discrepancy may be
explained at least in part by the fact that we relied on figures that under-
estimated the number of fatalities and injuries. As discussed earlier, we
used the low number of fatalities as the starting point for our calcula-
tions, so our estimates may not capture the costs for all of the injuries or
fatalities resulting from Ford SUV rollovers. Our estimate may also be
too low because we excluded pain and suffering, assuming that the Ford
and Firestone payments included compensation for pain and suffering.
Our estimate that extended costs range from $740,000 to $2.55 mil-
lion depends on the particular projections made about the nature of the
injuries that were suffered and the duration of various costs. We believe
that we have made realistic assumptions, but the amount of extended
costs will vary based on the projected outcome of the accident.
The estimates of extended costs involving medical expenses may
also understate costs because they are not adjusted for future inflation,
which is significant given the potential time periods. Consider, in scena-
rio three, an estimate of the cost of institutionalized care for 40 years.
The discounted cost of the care is about $2.55 million using a 3 percent
discount rate. 117 The rate of inflation for medical services, however, was
109 percent for the decade spanning 1998-2007, as compared to an in-
crease in the general Consumer Price Index of 44 percent." I 8 If we as-
sume that the cost of medical services, such as institutional care,
increased 10 percent per year (a conservative estimate, given that from
2006 to 2007 medical services prices rose nearly 15 percent), the cost of
care is nearly $28.5 million in 2007 dollars, again using a discount rate
of 3 percent.
116 McDonald, Separations, Blow-Outs, and Fallout, supra note 76, at 1078. Both
amounts are probably stated in 2000 dollars.
117 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
118 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAnSTnCS, available at http:Il
www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables (Data input for this comparison is for all comm6dities and for medi-
cal services, 1998-2007).
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Conversely, some of our estimates of extended costs may overstate
costs because the discrete costs that factor into the estimate do not pro-
duce a net reduction in social wealth as large as the cost itself. For ex-
ample, in scenario one, we counted as a cost the equity that the family
lost in the value of their home ($100,800) when they filed for bank-
ruptcy.119 The purchase price of the house, however, may have been dis-
counted to some extent because it was sold as part of a bankruptcy
proceeding, which means an economic gain for some other family would
have offset the loss of wealth to the family to some extent. Since the
information needed to compare social costs to actual costs depends on a
wide array of external factors and is often unknown, we treated the entire
loss of equity as a loss of social wealth.
A similar objection concerns the loss of wages in scenario two.
Analysts who follow a "friction cost" approach believe that the only de-
crease in social wealth occurs during the time it takes a firm to find a
healthy replacement worker.1 20 While this may correctly describe the
cost to the individual employer, it is not an appropriate measure of the
loss from society's point of view. Consider the process of hiring a re-
placement worker after the original worker is killed in an SUV accident.
From the point of view of society-the proper perspective from which to
measure externalities-both the deceased worker, had he or she lived,
and the replacement worker would have added value to aggregate social
wealth over their lifetimes. The problem with the "friction cost" ap-
proach is that it assumes the potential healthy replacement worker would
be unemployed for a lifetime, which is unlikely.
Even in the short run, the "friction cost" approach is problematic
because it employs the unrealistic assumption that replacement workers
are available for all of the persons who are unable to work due to injuries
from dangerous products. Based on data from Finkelstein and his col-
leagues 2 1 and from Lawrence and his coauthors, t2 2 we can estimate that
dangerous products were responsible for over 22,000 deaths and over 25
million injuries in 2000. If we assume that "full employment" corre-
sponds to a 4 percent unemployment rate, the number of potential re-
placement workers available for those jobs left vacant by the deaths and
injuries would be zero in 2000 and roughly one million in 2001.123
119 See supra Table 6; note 87 and accompanying text.
120 See Magnus Johannesson & Goran Karlsson, The Friction Cost Method: A Comment,
16 J. HEALTH ECON. 249 (1997).
121 See FrNKs'STEN Er AL, supra note 8.
122 See Lawrence, supra note 9.
123 There are no workers available in 2000 because the unemployment rate for that year
was 4.0 percent. There are one million workers available in 2001 because the unemployment
rate for that year was 4.7 percent. The difference between 4.0 percent unemployment and 4.7
percent unemployment is one million workers. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Statistical Ab-
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Finally, it is easy enough to imagine that our conservative approach
means that our scenarios understate the external costs of an SUV rollover
by excluding other likely expenses. In scenario one, for example, we did
not include any costs that would be borne by the public sector. These
costs could run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars if the family
qualifies for Social Security Disability payments, and perhaps food
stamps and housing and utility subsidies.
IV. BAYCOL
The second case study is of the social costs associated with serious
adverse effects caused by the pharmaceutical drug Baycol. This section
first describes the product defect that made this drug a dangerous prod-
uct. We then discuss how we derived our estimate of a total of $284
million in traditional COI costs and from $159,000 to $2.2 million in
extended costs per family, both in 2007 dollars. We again end with a
discussion of our results.
A. Product Defect
The generic name for Baycol is cerivastatin and, as this name indi-
cates, it is a member of a class of drugs known as statins. 124 Statins
reduce cholesterol levels in the body, thus decreasing the probability of
heart attacks and strokes. 125 Generally, statins are safe, but some indi-
viduals' muscles are sensitive to elevated levels of statins, thereby caus-
ing a muscular disease known as myopathy. 126 Statins can also cause a
severe form of myopathy known as rhabdomyolysis, 127 which can lead to
permanent damage, significant disability, or even death.128
While all statins carry a risk of myopathy and rhabdomyolysis, pa-
tients taking Baycol experienced higher incidence of these side effects.
Part of the problem may have been that researchers designed Baycol to
be 60 to 200 times more potent than other statins on the market. 129 Con-
sequently, the FDA limited its approval of the use of Baycol to smaller
stract: 2008, at 373, tbl.569 (indicating unemployment data for 2000 and 2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstractllabor.pdf.
124 See In re Baycol Products Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 197, 201 (D. Minn. 2003).
125 Jane E. Brody, Statins: Miracles for Some, Menace for a Few, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10,
2002, at F7.
126 Scott M. Grundy, The Issue of Statin Safety: Where Do We Stand?, 11 CIRCULATION
3016, 3016 (2005).
127 Amy Haavisto Kind et al., Rhabdomyolysis from the Combination of a Statin and
Gemfibrozil: An Uncommon but Serious Adverse Reaction, 101 Wis. MED. J. 53, 54 (2002).
128 Jeanne Bruno-Joyce et al., Cerivastatin and Gemfibrozil-Associated Rhabdomyol-
ysis, 35 THE ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY, 1016, 1018 (2001).
129 Id. at 1016.
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doses. 130 In an attempt to improve Baycol's effectiveness, Bayer asked
the FDA to approve higher dosages, which it eventually did. 131
Problems began to occur when people took Baycol in higher
doses, 132 particularly in elderly women with smaller bodies. 133 Reports
of side effects that physicians sent to the FDA from 1990 to 2002 indi-
cated that the probability of Baycol-induced rhabdomyolysis was 65
times higher than the probability of this side effect in all other statins
combined.134 A subsequent FDA-supervised analysis found that rhabdo-
myolysis-related mortality rates for Baycol users were 16 to 86 times
higher than for users of other statins. 135
Bayer removed Baycol from the market on August 8, 2001.136 Doc-
uments, including e-mails, memos, and sworn depositions uncovered
during class action litigation against Bayer, suggest that company execu-
tives were aware of the serious health risks associated with the drug prior
to the recall. 137 Despite this, Bayer continued to market the drug in a
manner that prompted an FDA warning to Bayer that its marketing
materials were "false, lacking in fair balance or otherwise misleading"
and that they downplayed "the most important risk information."' 138
130 Bruce M. Psaty et al, Potential for Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Suspected
Adverse Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatin and Risk of Rhabdomyolysis, 292 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 2622, 2622 (2004). Bayer has responded to this article and many of its claims. See
Joseph D. Piorkowski, Bayer's Response to "Potential for Conflict of Interest in the Evalua-
tion of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatin and Risk of Rhabdomyolysis,"
292 J. AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N 2655 (2004).
131 In re Baycol Products Litigation, 218 F.R.D. at 202; Psaty et al., supra note 130, at
2624.
132 Gina Kolata & Edmund L. Andrews, Anticholesteral Drug Pulled After Link With 31
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001, at A12.
133 Psaty et al., supra note 130, at 2628.
134 Id. at 2625.
135 Id. FDA also found that morality rates for Baycol users was 10 to 50 times higher
than for the use of other statins when individuals used both Baycol and Gemfibrozil, another
drug often prescribed with Baycol. Id. at 2626. The two drugs were prescribed together be-
cause, when combined, they greatly increased the reduction in cholesterol, but when used
together, even individuals using a relatively low-risk statin experienced some muscle destruc-
tion. Kind, supra note 127, at 55.
136 Philip J. Hilts, Drug's Problems Raise Questions on Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2001, at Fl.
137 See Melody Petersen & Alex Berenson, Papers Indicate That Bayer Knew of Dangers
ofIts Cholesterol Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at Al; Psaty et al., supra note 130, at 2623
(describing warning labels that appeared on Baycol bottles).
138 Petersen & Berenson, supra note 137, at C14. Responding to mounting pressure in
May 2001, three months before the recall, Bayer issued a "Dear Healthcare Professional" let-
ter, warning physicians of the potential side effects of the drug, and highlighting that
gemfibrozil created a particular hazard. See In re Baycol Products Litigation, 218 F.R.D. at
202
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Baycol was linked to at least 100 deaths by early 2002,139 and be-
tween 1,000 and 1,600 severe nonfatal injuries. 140 In January 2007, par-
ties in a multidistrict class action concerning Baycol reported to the court
that defendants had settled 3,067 cases with a total value of
$1,154,343,835.141 They also reported that the number of active cases
was approximately 1,200.142
B. Traditional COI Costs
We assumed that Baycol caused 3,067 total injuries based on the
report that Bayer had settled 3,067 cases in the multidistrict class action
litigation.143 Our assumptions about the number of fatalities and long-
term disabilities were based on an analysis of FDA data.144 We assumed
that 3.6 percent, or 110, of these 3,067 injuries resulted in deaths based
on statistical data detailing the frequency of deaths among Baycol
users. 145 We further assumed there were 159 injuries that resulted in
long-term disability (5.2 percent of the 3,067 total injuries). 46 For the
remaining 2,798 injuries, 147 we assumed each injury resulted in acute
disease and a single hospitalization. Finally, based on the same FDA
data, we assumed that the injuries occurred in two age categories (50 to
64 and 65+), 30 percent of the cases were in the first category and 70
percent were in the second, and 52.35 percent of those injured were
male. 148
We matched available cost data to the fatal and nonfatal categories
as well as to the age and gender categories identified above. Hospital
139 Petersen & Berenson, supra note 137, at Al.
140 See In re Baycol, 218 F.R.D. at 202 (reporting injuries of at least 1,000 persons);
Expert Witness Report of R. Samuel Mayer, MD, at 4, In re Baycol Products Litigation, No.
MDL 1431, 2005 WL 2464940 (D. Minn. 2005), available at 2005 WL 1341252 (referring to
1,579 reports of sever muscle damage from toxic rhabdomyolysis); Petersen & Berenson,
supra note 137, at Al (reporting injuring of approximately 1,600 persons); Ameet Sachdev,
Attorney Fired On Perjury Charge: Kenneth Moll Loses Key Post, CH. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2004,
at § 3, 7.
141 See Baycol Product Liability Litigation, Current Developments, United States. District
Court, District of Minnesota, available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/MDL-Baycol/
#current.
142 See id.
143 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
144 See generally Mohamed A. Omar & James P. Wilson, FDA Adverse Event Reports on
Statin-Associated Rhabdomyolysis, 36 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHEARPY 288 (2002).
145 See id. at 291.
146 Id. The article is not clear about the definition of disability, but the authors present
separate categories for persons who suffered disabilities and persons who were only hospital-
ized, which is the same distinction that we make.
147 The number of remaining injuries was calculated by deducting the previous two num-
bers from the total number of injuries; i.e., 3,067 (total injuries) - 110 (deaths) - 159 (long-
term disability) = 2,798.
148 See Omar & Wilson, supra note 144, at 291.
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charges and costs were drawn from government health care data.1 49 We
estimated all medical costs with the traditional total-to-hospital costs
method. 150 We again used data from Finkelstein's work for our estimate
of lost production due to fatalities and to injuries.1 51 We then assumed
that the lost production costs for permanent injuries were the same as for
fatalities. All of these estimates were adjusted upward for inflation from
the years 2000 and 2003 to the year 2007. Table 8 summarizes the re-
sults of the previous calculations.
149 See Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Serv., Welcome to HCUPnet, available at http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov. From this source, we ob-
tained data for the cost of treating rhabdomyolysis using cost estimates for all disorders of
muscle, ligament, and fascia (ICD9 = 728.8 and number 728). These data, however, need to
be deflated because they are expressed as charges, not true hospital costs. The actual hospital
charges reflect the interaction of insurance companies and the hospitals because insurance
companies routinely challenge initial charges. Since the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Pro-
ject estimated that the ratio between hospital charges and actual costs is 0.3554, we multiplied
by the charges for the treatment of rhabdomyolysis by 0.3554 to produce our treatment cost
estimates.
150 In this method, a multiplication factor is calculated based upon the ratio of the percent
all medical costs for all diseases and injuries (100%) divided by hospital-only costs for all
diseases and injuries (in our case 100% / 30.7%). See HCUP FACTS AND FIGURES, STATISnCS
ON HOSPITAL BASED CASE n THE UNITED STATES, 2005, available at http://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/reports/factsandfigures/HAR_- 2005.pdf. We assumed average medical costs
would apply to our "hospitalizations" category, but that our categories of death and disability
involved higher medical costs. For fatalities, we assumed that medical costs would be twice
the average medical costs for hospitalizations. See HCUPnet, supra (indicating a mean medical
cost for treating disorders of muscle, ligament, and fascia of $17,762 and a median cost of
$11,857). Since the mean cost is much higher than the median cost, and because this suggests
that medical costs have long right-tail, it is reasonable to assume fatal costs are at least twice
the average. For disabilities, we assumed that medical costs for persons in the 50-to-64 age
category would be four times the average medical costs of hospitalizations, and for persons in
the 65 and older category, we assumed these costs to be twice this average. The medical cost
estimates from HCUPnet reflect only one year. Permanent disability will likely generate medi-
cal costs for every year until the person dies. For persons who were permanently disabled, we
assumed those in the 50-to-64 age category will live longer and require four times more medi-
cal care than the average cost. We assumed those persons in the 65 and older category would
only require two times as much care as the average cost since these persons would not live as
long as those in 50-to-64 age category.
151 See FINKELSTEIN Er AL., supra note 8, at 119, 121.
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TABLE 8: BAYCOL TOTAL MEDICAL AND LOST-PRODUCTION COSTS
Medical Lost 1
Costs Production
Male fatalities by age
60 years $795,399 $18,351,815 $19,147,214
70 years $2,375,358 $9,797,022 $12,172,381
Female fatalities by age
60 years $724,038 $10,590,987 $11,315,041
70 years $2,162,098 $ 7,927,349 $10,089,447
Disabled men by age
60 years $4,598,900 $26,526,715 $31,125,590
70 years $6,866,945 $14,161,1517 $21,028,095
Disabled women by age
60 years $4,186,302 $15,308,791 $19,495,093
70 years $6,250,428 $11,458,623 $17,709,051
Hospitalized men by age
60 years $10,116,024 $23,264,086 $33,379,670
70 years $30,209,212 $16,526,222 $46,736,460
Hospitalized women by age
60 years $9,208,448 $12,213,264 $21,421,711
70 years $27,497,019 $12,674,779 $40,172,732
TOTAL $104,990,171 $178,800,805 $283,792,485
C. Extended Costs
We also estimated that Baycol caused extended costs of between
$159,000 and $2.2 million per family based on the three following hypo-
thetical scenarios.
1. Individual with Severe Leg Pain
A sixty-year-old divorced woman, following an episode of rhabdo-
myolysis after taking Baycol, requires twice-weekly physical therapy for
two years for leg pain. During this period, she can hardly walk and can-
not drive her car. She takes early retirement from a $30,000 per year job
and must rely on Medicaid rather than private health insurance. Her
daughter postpones college for two years to care for her mother full time
and thereby delays entering the workforce. As summarized in Table 9,
these extended costs total nearly $160,000 in 2007 dollars, discounted at
3 percent and without any adjustment for inflation.
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TABLE 9: BAYCOL EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO ONE
Family Public Sector
Physical therapy $14,572 -
Reduced retirement account $14,139 -
Medicaid - $62,479
Daughter delay into workforce $68,159 -
TOTAL $96,870 $62,479
GRANT TOTAL $159,349
We estimated physical therapy costs based on therapy twice a week
based on the conservative assumption that they lasted for two years and
used reimbursement rates presented to the Texas state health commis-
sion. 152 The cost of early retirement assumes that the woman contributed
ten percent of her total compensation to to her 401(k) and earned a five
percent return. The Medicaid estimate assumes five years of support and
is based on cost data published by the federal government. 153 The cost to
the daughter of delaying entry into college is based on the loss of two
years of income at the median annual earnings of college graduates.' 54
2. Individual Unable to Walk
The second scenario assumes that a sixty-eight-year-old man loses
his ability to walk due to Baycol-induced rhabdomyolysis, resulting in
clinical depression. Because his sixty-eight-year old spouse cannot care
for her husband, both move to a nursing home for seven years. A daugh-
ter, aged fifty, moves back to the city where her parents are located to
provide support for them, taking a 20 percent pay cut. Her productivity
in her new job is adversely affected by her caregiving role for her par-
ents. After the wife dies, the husband moves to a less expensive, Medi-
caid-funded nursing home for the remaining five years of his life. As
summarized in Table 10, these extended costs total slightly over $1.0
million in 2007 dollars, discounted at 3 percent and without any adjust-
ment for inflation.
152 See SuEs & McDONALD, supra note 103 (indicating rate of $77.65 per hour).
153 See 2006 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 98, at 58 (indicating disabled individ-
uals on Medicaid had a cost in 2003 of approximately $12,855 per year).
154 See Cosca, supra note 86 (indicating persons with a college degree have a median
income per year of $36,155). Our estimate assumes she graduates college and that there is no
significant loss in pension or Social Security benefits.
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TABLE 10: BAYCOL EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO Two
PublicFamily Sector
Nursing home $392,638 -
Husband Less Expensive nursing - $116,073
home
Wife Nursing home $392,638 -
Moving costs $10,700 -
Daughter Lost income (12 years) $84,166 -
Increased health premium $20,200 -
Lost pension income $11,222 -





The estimate of the nursing home costs assumes that the couple re-
sided there for seven years. It relies on published insurance company
data indicating the cost of a semi-private room in a nursing home.' 55
The cost of the less expensive nursing home is based on Medicaid data
and assumes five years of occupancy.' 56 The moving costs reflect data
on the average cost of interstate moves. 157 The daughter's lost income is
based on an assumption that she went from a job at $50,000 to a job at
$40,000 for twelve years. In addition, we hypothesize that she has $200
per month higher health care premiums with no increase in the cost of
insurance from year to year until she becomes eligible for Medicare. We
calculated that the change in jobs reduces the contribution to her 401(k)
by $1,000 per year, an amount which would have earned a 5 percent
annual return had she made the contributions. The estimate of lost pro-
ductivity of the employer is based on a study of the cost of lost produc-
tive work time among workers with depression and assumes twelve years
of employment. 158
155 See MetLifePress Release, supra note 92 (indicating average cost of a semi-private
room is $189 dollars per day, or $68,985 a year based on a 365-day calendar in 2007 data).
156 See 2006 STATsTIcA SUPPLEMENT, supra note 98, at 5 (indicating average cost of
Medicaid nursing facility services in 2003 of $23,882).
157 See STATE OF WASH., MOVING ExPENsE REGULATION AND GUIDE (indicating average
interstate move weighing 9,000 pounds cost $10,700), available at www.ga.wa.gov/ PCA/
forms/a33form.doc.
158 See Steward et al., supra note 89 (indicating an average cost of $3,600 per year).
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
3. Individual on Dialysis
The final scenario assumes a forty-five-year-old man who is on dial-
ysis for the remaining twenty-five years of his life as a result of Baycol-
induced rhabdomyolysis. He is forced to give up his job as partner at a
major law firm. His wife takes on major caregiving responsibilities. A
physical therapist visits his home once a week to ease his leg pain. As
summarized in Table 11, the estimated extended costs are $2,206,630,
discounted at 3 percent and not taking into account the impact of
inflation.
TABLE 11: BAYCOL EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO THREE
Family
Lost earnings $1,791,020
Lost vacation time $101,033
Reduced 401 (k) assets at retirement $191,042
Physical therapist $46,149
Spouse Caretaker costs 10 years $77,386
TOTAL $2,206,630
We included lost earnings in this hypothetical as an extended cost
because it is likely that the lawyer's annual earnings exceeded the lost
earnings reflected in our earlier calculation of traditional COI costs,
which was based on the average lost earnings of accident victims. We
assumed for purposes of our calculation that the lawyer earned $200,000
more than the average victim, would have worked for an additional
twenty-five years but for his illness, and received $50,000 a year in disa-
bility payments. The estimate of lost vacation time is based on the value
of the lawyer's compensation for five weeks per year. The reduced
money in the victim's 401(k) assumes that contributions to his retirement
fund constituted 20 percent of the $400,000 (with no interest accruing).
The value of the wife's caregiving is calculated on the basis of an AARP
study on the economic value of family caregiving, 159 and assumes the
spouse provides care for ten years. The cost of the physical therapist's
services is based on insurance data indicating the average cost of such
services,160 and assumes that the services were provided once a week for
twenty-five years.
159 See GIBSON & HOUSER, supra note 84 (indicating individual provides approximately
$10,400 a year in unpaid care).
160 See SUEHS & McDONALD, supra note 103 (indicating a $77.65 per hour rate).
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D. Discussion
Our calculations of traditional COI costs assumed a total of 3,067
injuries based on the number of settlements reported in a multidistrict
class action litigation concerning Baycol. 16' This appears to understate
the number of injuries because the parties in the litigation also reported
that 1,200 cases that remained unresolved, 162 and because it is likely that
some Baycol victims never sued. Based on a study by Omar and Wilson,
we further assumed that 3.6 percent, or 110, of these 3,067 resulted in
deaths. 163 This assumption is consistent with reports that Baycol was
linked to 100 deaths by early 2002.164
Our estimate of $284 million in traditional COI costs is.considera-
bly less than the $1.154 billion in settlements that Bayer is reported to
have paid. 165 Since this number is based on a report to the court by the
litigants, we assume that it is valid. Our methodology may have under-
stated COI costs for a number of reasons.
First, our medical costs were drawn from hospital data on the costs
of treating disorders of muscle, ligament, and fascia. 166 Our estimate
does not include the cost of dialysis because we do not know how many
persons taking Baycol needed this medical treatment, but if a significant
number of patients who suffered Baycol-induced rhabdomyolysis re-
quired dialysis, our medical costs may be too low by a significant
margin.
Second, our medical costs estimates involved certain assumptions
about the relationship of long-term medical costs to the average cost of
hospitalizations. 167 For example, we assumed that medical costs for per-
sons in the 50-to-64 age category would be four times the average costs
of hospitalization because we lacked actual data on the hospital costs of
patients in this category who were injured by taking Baycol. While we
believe that these assumptions are reasonable ones, they are assumptions
and may not precisely reflect the true cost of medical costs in the rele-
vant categories. Indeed, since our COI estimates are significantly less
than $1.154 billion in settlements that Bayer is reported to have paid, we
may have significantly underestimated the relationship of long-term
medical costs to the average cost of hospitalizations.
Finally, our estimate of traditional COI costs excludes pain and suf-
fering. We are uncertain of the extent to which the money paid by Bayer
161 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 150.
167 Id.
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in Baycol settlements reflects compensation for this dimension of injury,
but our exclusion of the cost of pain and suffering may explain some of
the discrepancy between our estimate and the total amount of the Baycol
settlement.
Our calculations of extended costs that range from $159,000 to $2.2
million per family are subject to the same qualifications mentioned in the
discussion of our SUV rollover estimates. First, our estimate of extended
costs depends on the assumptions that we made about the nature of the
injuries that individuals suffered and the duration of various costs. Sec-
ond, because the estimates of extended costs of medical expenses do not
take into account future inflation, they are understated by some unknown
amount. Third, we treated the loss of employment as a reduction in so-
cial wealth based on the existence of frictional employment. Finally, our
estimates of extended costs may have been understated because we did
not include additional costs that could occur in the type of situation we
have hypothesized. Consider the daughter in scenario two who is forced
to take a lower paid job in order to be with her parents. It is easy to
imagine that she might become isolated and depressed, resulting in addi-
tional medical expenses if she sought treatment.
V. ALL TERRAIN VEHICLES
Our final case study estimates the external costs of three-wheeled
ATVs. We follow the same format as before, with a description of the
product defect that made these ATVs a dangerous product followed by
an explanation of how we derived our estimate of a total of $3.9 billion
in traditional COI social costs and $289,000 to $2.36 million of extended
costs per family. We conclude with a discussion of the results.
A. Product Defect
All-terrain vehicles were introduced to the American market in
1970.168 An ATV is a three- or four-wheeled motorized vehicle with
large, low-pressurized tires, a seat designed to be straddled, and handle-
bars for steering, that is intended for use on non-paved terrain. During
the 1980s, there was both a substantial increase in ATV sales and in the
number of persons injured and killed in ATV accidents. As Table 12
indicates, sales increased by over 50 percent between 1984 and 1985,
peaking at 600,000 units. During the same period, there was an 80 per-
cent increase in injuries and fatalities.
168 Michael J. Moore & Wesley A. Magat, The Injury Risk Consequences of the All-
Terrain Vehicle Consent Decrees, 17 IN'L REv. L. & ECON. 379, 380 (1997).
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TABLE 12: ATV SALES, FATALITIES, INJURIES 169
Year Sales Reported Reported
(1,000s) Deaths Injuries
1972-1977 139 n.a. n.a.
1978-1979 154 n.a. n.a.
1980 126 n.a. n.a.
1981 100 n.a. n.a.
1982 290 29 10,100
1983 457 85 32,100
1984 625 156 77,900
1985 602 251 105,700
1986 481 347 106,000
1987 399 283 93,600
1988 217 286 74,600
1989 145 258 70,300
1990 129 250 59,500
1991 138 256 58,100
1992 152 251 58,200
1993 173 136 49,800
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), a federal ad-
ministrative agency, became alarmed about the increasing number of
death and injury reports and issued a series of safety alerts in late
1984.170 In 1985, CPSC published an advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking concerning ATVs, the first step required under its statutory
mandate to establish a product safety standard.171 CPSC then requested
that manufacturers cease producing ATVs designed for use by children
12 years and under. 172 After ATV manufacturers rejected that request,
CPSC referred the matter to the Department of Justice, which filed a
legal action in 1987 seeking to have ATVs designed for use by children
declared an imminently hazardous consumer product.173 In 1988, the
169 See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, 2003 ArNUAL REPORT OF ALL-
TERRAIN VEHICLE (ATV)-RELATED DEATHS AND INJURIES 4 tbl. 1, 9 tbl. 5 (2005) (reporting on
number of fatalities and injuries); Gary T. Ford and Michael B. Mazis, Informing Buyers of
Risks: Analysis of the Marketing and Regulation of All Terrain Vehicles, 30 J. CONSUMER AFw.
90, 92 tbl. 1 (1996) (indicating number of ATVs sold during each given year).
170 Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 94; Moore & Magat, supra note 168, at 383.
171 Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 95. Before CPSC can publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking for a new safety standard, it must publish an advanced notice of proposed rulemak-
ing that solicits proposals for the standard. See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a) (2006); Teresa Schwartz,
The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 32, 71 (1982) (describing the CPSC rulemaking process).
172 Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 95.
173 Id.
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five major ATV manufacturers settled this lawsuit and agreed to stop
sales of all three-wheel vehicles, among other actions.1 74
Four aspects of ATVs made them dangerous for consumers. First,
the ATV design impeded riders from safely using the machines in two
ways. The low inflation tires functioned to absorb the impact from rug-
ged terrain at higher speeds, but increased the likelihood of an accident
when riders intuitively slowed at significant bumps. 175 The ATVs design
also allowed even a small amount of over-steering to cause a tip-over. 176
According to CPSC analysis, 70 percent of ATV accidents involved tip-
overs. 177 Second, the triangular configuration of the three-wheel ATVs
made the model less stable and more prone to overturning than the four-
wheel model.178 Third, a sizable number of the injuries and fatalities
were among inexperienced users and children, whose weaker skills exac-
erbated the difficulty of ATV use. 179 Finally, the high percentage of ac-
cidents and fatalities among inexperienced drivers and young drivers
appeared to be linked to inadequate warnings and a lack of consumer
education. 180
174 Moore & Magat, supra note 168, at 384. The manufacturers also agreed to engage in
educational efforts to warn new and past purchases about age appropriate use of ATVs and
other risks and to adopt a voluntary industry-wide design standard to make ATVs safer to use.
The CPSC approved the voluntary standard adopted by the industry later in 1988, and it was
adopted by the American National Standards Institute in 1990. Id. at 385.
175 Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 97. Slowing down compromised the tire's ability to
compensate for impacts, creating a rebound effect that could unbalance the ATV and throw the
rider. At the same time, the under-inflation of the balloon tires tended to create a large amount
of friction; the gripping effect could potentially pull the ATV into a roll when the machine was
operated on pavement. Id.
176 Id. at 96. This propensity resulted from certain ATV design features: a high center of
gravity; a solid rear axle; and a relatively narrow wheel base. When turning the vehicle, riders
are supposed to shift their weight outwards while turning the handlebars inward. This action is
not intuitive, particularly for motorcyclists or bikers who are accustomed to leaning into a turn.
On an ATV doing so would actually increase the possibility of a rollover. Id.
177 Id. (indicating that 70 percent of all ATV accidents involved the ATV rolling or tip-
ping over).
178 Daniel L. Rubinfield & Gregory B. Rodgers, Evaluating the Injury Risk Associated
with All-Terrain Vehicles: An Application of Bayes' Rule, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 145, 149,
156 n. 10 (1992).
179 In the first half of the 1980s, 13 percent of all accidents involved a first-time rider, and
riders with less than one month's experience had thirteen times the risk of being in a serious
accident than average. Moore & Magat, supra note 168, at 386. Furthermore, approximately
38 percent of all ATV fatalities and 40 percent of all serious injuries between 1985 and 1993
involved children under 16 years of age. Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 94.
180 Prior to the consent settlement, manufacturers and dealers failed to train a substantial
percentage of novice drivers, and failed to supply much information about ATV safety
hazards. Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 113. In addition, there is little evidence that ATV
advertising stressed safety or the potential additional risks of three-wheel vehicles. Rubinfield
& Rodgers, supra note 178, at 153.
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Claimants filed an estimated 1,500 tort cases against ATV manufac-
turers prior to 1992.181 As of that time, 1,000 cases had been resolved,
with about 95 percent of the cases settling. Of the settlements, 40 per-
cent were in the $50,000 to $250,000 range, 40 percent were in the
$250,000 to $1,000,000 range, and 20 percent were over $1 million. 182
Insurance data from Honda reveals that the average value of claims set-
tled by the company for accidents between 1978 and 1988 was
$859,003.183 Another source indicates that Honda had paid $84 million
dollars in settlements through 1990.184 Based on this source and
Honda's 75 percent market share, and by assuming that other manufac-
turers had comparable settlement rates and outcomes, Ford and Mazis
estimate that the industry paid $113 million in settlements through
1990.185 Although there are no data on the overall results of cases that
went to trial, it is noteworthy that in 1994 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a decision of the Oregon courts granting $5 million in
punitive damages, in addition to $735,000 in actual damages, for a 1985
Honda ATV accident. 8 6
B. Traditional COI Estimates
We based our estimate of traditional COI costs on the number of
fatalities and injuries avoided due to the decision of ATV manufacturers
to stop making three-wheeled models. Put another way, we estimated
the cost of fatalities and injuries that would have occurred if three-wheel
ATVs had not been removed from the market for the period from 1990
through 2002. As noted earlier, the three-wheel models were particularly
prone to tipping over,187 and the five major manufacturers of ATVs had
stopped making three-wheelers by the time of the CPSC settlement. 188
This section summarizes the methodology we used to make the COI
estimate.
We choose the years 1985 through 1989 as baseline for measuring
percent of deaths due to three- and four-wheelers because three-wheeled
181 See Rubinfield & Rodgers, supra note 178, at 157 n.24. The authors base this esti-
mate on a conversation with an expert who testified in ATV ton litigation.
182 Id.
183 See John C. Cabaniss, Honda ATV Litigation in Retrospect, available at http://Ii-
brary.findlaw.com/ 1992/Nov/i/130577.html. Cabaniss indicates that his source for this figure
is an insurance claim printout from Honda in his possession.
184 See Ford & Mazis, supra note 169, at 113 (citing Ralph B. Wegis, Honda ATVLitiga-
tion in Retrospect, TR1M, November, 1992, at 37).
185 Id. at 114. The authors estimate that the industry had paid $336 million dollars in
settlements and legal fees. Since this estimate assumed that legal fees were twice as much as
payments to plaintiffs, the settlement amount is $113 million. Id. at 113.
186 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
187 See Rubiinfield & Rodgers, supra note 178 and accompanying text.
188 Moore & Magat, supra note 168, at 385.
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vehicles ceased to be a significant cause of ATV fatalities after 2002.189
CPSC lacks data on the number of fatalities prior to 1982.190 The per-
cent of all deaths due to accidents involving four-wheelers from 1985
through 1989 was 39.6 percent,191 which means that 60.4 percent of all
deaths involved three-wheelers. Using the same approach, we estimated
that three-wheeled ATVs injured 67.0 percent more persons from 1985
through 1989 than four-wheeled ATVs based on the CPSC data. 192
Based on the percentage of fatalities and injuries caused by three-
wheeled vehicles during the base period, we estimated the numbers of
deaths and other injuries that would have occurred from 1990 onwards
had manufacturers continued to produce three-wheeled vehicles. For ex-
ample, the CPSC data indicate that there were 151 deaths in 1990 involv-
ing four-wheelers. 193 Based on this number, we estimate that had three-
wheeled vehicles remained on the market, there would have been 61 ad-
ditional fatalities in 1990.194 Using this methodology, we estimated that,
had three-wheeled vehicles remained on the market between 1990 and
1993, there would have been 1,543 additional fatalities during that
period.
Using published data on ATV-related hospitalizations, 195 we as-
sumed 80 percent of all injuries were among men and 20 percent were
among women. The same source estimates that 30 percent of all injuries
189 According to a CPSC report, the following percentages of fatalities were associated
with 4-wheelers between 1985 and 2002: 19% (1985), 27% (1986), 45% (1987), 53% (1988),
59% (1989), 60% (1990), 91% (1999), and 94% (2002). ROBIN L, INGLE & ROBIN A.
STREETER, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF ATV DEATHS
AND INJURIES/AMENDED 9 tbl.4 (2005), available at http://www.cpsc.gov1ibrary/atv2005.pdf.
We calculated these percentages by dividing the estimated number of deaths involving four
wheeled ATVs (column 4) by the estimated number of total fatalities associated to ATVs
(column 3).
190 See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION supra note 169 and accompany-
ing table.
191 We calculated this percentage by dividing the total number of fatalities involving four-
wheeled vehicles (55+95+126+152+153) by the total number of estimated fatalities
(258+286+282+347+295), where the first set of numbers are deaths due to four-wheelers from
1985 to 1989 and second set are all deaths. See INGLE & STREETER, supra note 189, at 9 tbl.4.
192 Moore and Magat, supra note 168, at 391, interpret earlier published data as establish-
ing "three-wheel ATVs are likely to experience between 57 and 86% more injuries than four-
wheel ATVs." The average between these percentages is 67 percent.
193 INGLE & STREETER, supra note 189, at 9 tbl.4.
194 We arrive at this estimate by multiplying 151 by 0.604 and then multiplying the result
by 0.67. The first calculation is based on our assumption, that three-wheeled vehicles caused
60.4 percent of all fatalities during the base period. See supra notes 191-193 and accompany-
ing text. But, based on our baseline assumption, the three-wheeled vehicles would have in-
jured 67 percent more persons than the four-wheeled vehicles. We therefore multiplied the
number of three-wheeled fatalities by 0.67 to obtain the number of additional fatalities that
would have been attributable to three-wheeled vehicles, had they remained on the market.
195 James C. Helmkamp et al., All-Terrain Vehicle-Related Hospitalizations in the United
States, 2000-2004, 34 AM. J. OF PREY. MED. 239, 239 (2008).
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were among persons who were seventeen years old or younger and that
70 percent of all injuries were among persons who were older than sev-
enteen. 196 For clarity, we constructed the synthetic cohort to consist of
only two ages: exactly seventeen years old and exactly thirty-five years
old. We assumed the seventeen-year olds accounted for 30 percent of all
injuries and deaths and that thirty-five-year olds accounted for the other
70 percent. These assumptions are summarized in Table 13.
TABLE 13: ATV PERCENTAGES OF MEN, WOMEN, AGE 17 AND AGE 35
Men, 80% Women, 20 %
Age=17,30% 24% 6%
Age=35, 70% 56% 14%
Finkelstein and his colleagues identify the number of persons who
have been killed or hospitalized as a result of motorcycle injuries.197 Be-
cause we assumed that injuries related to motorcycle accidents were sim-
ilar to ATV injuries, we took the ratio of these two numbers and applied
it to ATV accidents to estimate the number of persons requiring hospital-
ization. 198 Based on this ratio, we estimate that had manufacturers con-
tinued making three-wheeled ATVs, there would have been 12,377
additional hospitalizations. The same publication has data on the number
of persons injured in motorcycle accidents who did not require hospitali-
zation. 199 We used the ratio of this number and the number of persons
who died in motorcycle accidents to determine the number of persons
whose injuries did not require hospitalization. Based on the second ratio,
we estimate that had manufacturers continued making three-wheeled ve-
hicles, there would have been 124,369 additional injuries not requiring
hospitalization. Table 14 distributes the additional fatalities, injuries in-
volving hospitalization, and injuries not involving hospitalization among
the cohort identified in Table 13.
196 Id.
197 FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 46, app. 1.3. The ratio of persons hospitalized as
compared to the number who died was 8.0213 (22,957/2,862).
198 Finkelstein and his co-authors do not have data limited exclusively to ATVs. Further,
we reasoned that his category of "motorcycle" injuries and fatalities was more analogous to
ATVs than his category of "motor vehicle occupant." See id.
199 FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 46 app. 1.3. The ratio of the number of persons
whose injuries did not require hospitalization to the number of fatalities was 80.602 (230,983/
2,862).
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TABLE 14: ATV TOTAL FATALITIES, INJURIES WITH AND
WITHOUT HOSPITALIZATIONS
Deaths Injuries with Injuries without
hospitalizations hospitalizations
Men 1,234 24,674 99,495
Age 17 370 2,970 29,849
Age 35 864 6,931 69,646
Women 309 2,475 24,874
Age 17 93 742 7,462
Age 35 216 1,733 17,412
Total 1,543 12,377 124,369
Using data from Finkelstein and his colleagues, we estimated three
categories of medical costs: fatalities, injuries requiring hospitalization,
and injuries not requiring hospitalization. 200 We also estimated the indi-
rect costs associated with these three types of injuries using data from the
same source. 201 Table 15 summarizes the results. As it reveals, if manu-
facturers had not stopped making three-wheel ATVs, there would have
been an additional $3,892,537,700 in COI costs because of the injuries
that the vehicles would have caused during the years 1990 to 2002.
200 FiNELsTEiN Er AL., supra note 8, at 91-92 apps. 2.1-2.2. To estimate costs for seven-
teen year olds, we used Finkelstein's data for the 15-to-24 age category. To estimate costs for
thirty-five-year olds, we used the source's data for 25-to-44 age category. Whereas Finkel-
stein has data for fatal injuries and injuries involving hospitalization, the source does not have
data for injuries that do not involve hospitalization. We instead used their "outpatient" cate-
gory which appeared to be near the middle of the difference between their "ER treated" and
"Doctor's office" categories.
201 Id. at 119 app. 3.1, 121 app. 3.3. We again used the 15-to-24 age category for seven-
teen-year olds and the 25-to-44 age category for thirty-five-year olds. We used Finkelstein's
data for the categories of fatal injuries, injuries involving hospitalization, and injuries not re-
quiring hospitalization, but we used data for "productivity losses" rather for lost "wages and
fringe benefits," reasoning that lost home production should be counted in lost indirect costs
from society's perspective. This inclusion is standard in the literature. See id. at 97.
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TABLE 15: ATV TOTAL COI COSTS, 2007
DInjuries with Injuries without
I hospitalizations hospitalizations Total
Men
Age 17 $533,571,500 $346,344,620 $108,141,620 $988,057,740
Age 35 $1,259,968,900 $763,129,770 $334,448,434 $2,357,547,000
Women
Age 17 $82,099,229 $62,345,400 $22,822,595 $167,267,210
Age 35 $172,971,910 $136,260,840 $70,433,121 $379,665,870
TOTAL $2,048,611,500 $1,308,080,500 $535,845,760 $3,892,537,700
C. Extended Costs
This section presents three scenarios involving extended social costs
resulting from ATV rollovers. The scenarios involve extended costs that
range from $288,000 to almost $2.4 million per family. After presenting
each scenario, we summarize our methods and results.
1. Young Amputee
The first scenario assumes that an eighteen-year old, riding his
ATV, is thrown off balance. The ATV flips on him, resulting in a leg
injury that requires amputation. He is unable to take advantage of a foot-
ball scholarship that he won to attend a Class I university, causing him to
fall into a clinical depression for two years, during which time he does
not work. He needs weekly physical therapy for a year and psychother-
apy for ten years. He never goes to college, resulting in a loss of income.
As Table 16 indicates, the extended costs in this scenario are $289,000,
discounted at 3 percent and without taking into account the impact of
inflation.
TABLE 16: ATV EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO ONE
Family
Lost income $39,212




We estimated the young man's lost income for the two years that he
was unable to work by assuming he would have earned $10 per hour
during that time period and that he had no lost benefits. The estimate of
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income he lost because he did not attend college is based on data pub-
lished by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicating the difference in
median annual earnings between college and non-college graduates. 20 2
The cost of psychotherapy 20 3 and physical therapy204 is based on national
average hourly costs and our assumptions about the frequency of these
services indicated above.
2. Child with Moderate Brain Injury
In this scenario, we assume that a twelve-year-old boy suffers a
moderate traumatic brain injury in an ATV accident. His recovery at
home includes a year of mental health counseling. At school, he receives
special education for three years, and his eventual graduation from high
school is delayed for one year. Due to his injury, he is unable to go to
college as originally planned. After he is injured, his mother, age forty-
one, quits her job to take care of him. She finds another job, but at re-
duced pay, as well as reduced vacation, retirement, and health benefits.
Due to the increased hours she must work, she must pay for additional
child care, as well as the services of someone to transport her children to
and from after-school activities. As a result of reduced health care bene-
fits, she must pay out-of-pocket for orthodontics for her two daughters,
ages eight and ten years at the time of the accident, glasses for her son,
and dental services and drugs for all four family members. As Table 17
summarizes, this scenario produces nearly $600,000 in extended costs in
2007 dollars, discounted at 3 percent and without taking into account the
impact of inflation.
202 See Cosca, supra note 86 (indicating that in 1996, persons with a high school degree
had a median income of $23,317 per year as compared to $36,155 per year for high school
graduates).
203 See BROWN, JR. & BEAUREGARD, supra note 101 (indicating average hourly cost of
$106.08).
204 See SUEHS & McDONALD, supra note 103 (indicating cost of $77.65 per hour).
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TABLE 17: ATV EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO Two
Family Public
Injured Child Mental health therapy $6,055 -Lost wages $23,317 -
Lost life time earnings $200,561 -
Mother's lost income $30,000 -
Mother Reduced Income $186,023 -
Lost two-weeks vacation $27,554 -
Lost paid holidays $8,275 -
Orthodontics $10,285 -
Dental check-ups $8,909 -
Eye exams $2,765 -
Family Eye wear $603 -
Pharmacy $31,182
Child care and support
I services
School System I Special education - $32,232
TOTAL $545,172 $32,232
GRAND TOTAL $577,404
Our estimate of the cost of the boy's psychotherapy is based on
national average hourly costs and assumes weekly sessions for one
year.205 The estimate of his lost wages for his delayed entry into the
workforce uses government data indicating the average earnings of a
high school graduate.20 6 The income the boy loses because he did not
attend college is based on the same data source, which also compares
median annual earnings of college graduates and non-college gradu-
ates.207 The mother's lost income while she cared for her child is based
on her leaving the workforce for six months, and assumes that she had
been paid $5,000 per month. The estimate of her reduced income is
based on our assumption that her new job paid $10,000 less than her old
one, and that she was employed for 25 years in this position. We calcu-
lated the value of her lost vacation days by assuming that she had two
more weeks of vacation at her prior job, and we based the value of the
lost vacation days on her prior compensation. We further assumed that
she lost three paid holidays per year and valued this loss on the same
205 See BROWN, JR. & BEAUREGARD, supra note 101, at 4 (indicating an average hourly
cost of $106.08).
206 See Cosca, supra note 86 (indicating in 1,966 persons with a high school degree had a
median income of $23,317 per year).
207 See id. (indicating in 1,966 persons with a high school degree had a median income of
$23,317 per year as compared to $36,155 per year for high school graduates).
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basis. The costs of orthodontics, 20 8 dental care expenses, 20 9 eye exami-
nations, 210 drugs,211 and child care212 are based on data indicating the
average amount of these expenses. We based our estimate of the cost of
special education on data from the National Education Association. 213
3. Child with Brain Injury and Brother with Severe Emotional
Problems
Our last scenario involves an ATV rollover that left a younger child
comatose and an older child with serious emotional issues of guilt, survi-
vorship, and anger. Their mother, age forty, quits her job to become a
full-time caregiver, but she is unable to cope with the situation and
spends one year in a psychiatric hospital. After rejoining the family, she
continues therapy and is not able to work again. A grandmother quits her
job and moves into the house to help. Eventually the father decides the
family is unable to care for the younger child and the child is moved into
institutionalized care. The older child requires tutoring and psychologi-
cal counseling, and after graduating from high school, is unable to attend
college. As summarized in Table 18, this scenario involves over $2.36
million in extended costs in 2007 dollars, based on a three percent dis-
count rate and without taking into account the impact of inflation.
208 See Phil Galewitz, Brace Yourself: New Types Feel Better, USA TODAY, Oct. 15,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-10-15-bracesx.htm (indicat-
ing orthodontics costs between $5,000 to $6,000).
209 See TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR
SENATE BILL 34 (2002), available at http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/medicaid/reports/122002sb34
DentalCare.html#Costs (indicating Texas Medicaid Reimbursement rate of $50 for an exami-
nation, $90 for cleaning, and $150 for X-rays).
210 See CONNECTICARE, THE AVERAGE COST OF CARE, at 2 (2007), available at http://
www.connecticare.com/member/costofcare/costofcare.pdf (indicating the Connecticut Medi-
caid reimbursement rate of $90 for eye examinations); CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, EYE GLASSES,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/shopping/where-to-buy/eyeglasses- 1106/over
view/i 106_eyeov.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008) (indicating inexpensive plastic glasses cost
$120 per year). We assumed that the family purchased six pairs of eye glasses.
211 See TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N , HEALTHCARE COSTS IN HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAMS, PRESENTATION TO SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE (2001), availa-
ble at http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/news/presentations/HealthcareCosts102401.pdf (indicating
that the average cost of drugs is $866.85).
212 See MErLIE MARKET SURVEY, supra note 102, at 4 (indicating that average cost of
child care was $18 per hour). We further assumed that she used these services for three hours a
day, five days a week, during a thirty-six week school year for four years, and that the costs
were shared with two other families.
213 See NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILI-
TIES EDUCATION AcT (2007), available at http://www.nea.org/specialed/index.html (indicating
that special education cost $9,369 more than an average student cost of $7,552).
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TABLE 18: ATV EXTENDED COSTS-SCENARIO THREE
PublicFamily Sector
Mental health facility $208,345 -
Mother Psychotherapy (twice per $83,530 -
week for 9 years)
Lost income $344,449 -
Moving expenses $4,500 -
Lost income $160,948 -
Grandmother Lost health benefits $16,555 -
Lost vacation days $12,381 -
Lost 40 1(k) contributions $16,095 -
Incidental Expenses $16,555
Home tutoring costs $31,236 -
Older Child Mental health care $41,765 -
Loss of lifetime income $200,562 -
Younger Nursing home care - $928,286
Child Loss of life-time income $300,437 -
TOTAL $1,437,358 $928,286
GRAND TOTAL $2,365,644
We estimated the cost of the mother's one year of institutionalized
care based on data from the State of Washington.2 14 We assumed that
the mother required additional psychotherapy twice a week for nine
years, and we used published data indicating the average cost of such
therapy. 215 Her lost income was based on the assumption that her inabil-
ity to work meant forgoing twenty-two years of income, and, that she had
earned $30,000 per year prior to the accident. The grandmother's mov-
ing expenses were based on average interstate moving expenses. 216 For
her lost income, we assumed that she did not work for a period of six
years, and had previously earned $35,000 per year and $300 per month in
health benefits. We further assumed that she lost two weeks of paid va-
cation per year and ten days of paid holidays per year, which we valued
214 Hous. Div., Wash. State Dep't of Comty., Trade and Econ. Dev., Hous. Div., Ten-
Year Homeless Plan, at 15 (2006), available at http://cted.wa.gov/CTED/documents/
ID3356Publications.doc (indicating that the costs per-day of institutionalized care in a mental
hospital is $555, or $202,575 per year).
215 See BROWN, JR. & BEAUREGARD, supra note 101, at 1 (indicating an average hourly
cost of $106.08).
216 See STATE OF WASH., MOVING ExPENSE REGULATION AND GuIDE (2005), available at
http://www.acadweb.wwu.edulBFA/BusinessServices/a33form.pdf (ind-icating average intra-
state moving expenses when moving 8,400 pounds is $4,500).
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on the basis of her $35,000 annual salary. Another assumption is that
contributions to the grandmother's pension fund constituted 10 percent
of that income, and would have earned a return of 5 percent annually.
Finally, we assumed she spends approximately $2,400 a year of her own
money on expenses for the other family members over the nine years she
stayed with the family.
We further assumed that the older child requires tutoring three times
a week during the four years of high school, and mental health counsel-
ing once a week for nine years. These costs reflect published data on
average costs for tutoring217 and mental health care.218 The older child's
loss of income is based on the difference in median earning capacity of
high school and college graduates. 219 The cost of nursing home care for
the younger child is based on average rates and assumes twenty-five
years of care. 220 His loss of life-time income assumes he would have
worked for forty years and would have graduated from college.22'
D. Discussion
Our estimate of the number of fatalities and injuries that would have
occurred had manufacturers not stopped making three-wheel vehicles is
based on CPSC data on the numbers of persons killed by three-wheeled
ATVs prior to their removal from the market. While this gives our esti-
mate credibility, it does assume that the three-wheeled ATVs would have
caused the same number of fatalities as they have in the past had they
remained on sale. Since our estimates of the numbers of persons whose
injuries required and did not require hospitalization is extrapolated from
our estimate of the number of fatalities, the accuracy of these estimates
also depends on the reliability of our estimate of the number of fatalities.
Our estimate of $3.893 billion dollars in traditional COI costs is
considerably higher than a published estimate that the ATV industry paid
$113 million in settlements through 1990.222 This is despite the fact that
our estimate does not include pain and suffering costs. We question the
reliability of the $113 million number, and this is borne out by published
217 See Sam Dillon, For Children Being Left Behind, Private Tutors Face Rocky Start,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at Al (indicating that private high school tutoring costs of $40 to
$80 an hour).
218 See BROWN, JR. & BEAUREGARD, supra note 101, at 4 (indicating an average hourly
cost of $106.08).
219 See Cosca, supra note 86, at 21 (indicating persons with a college degree have a
median income of $36,155 a year compared to a median income of $23,317 for high school
graduates).
220 See MetLife Press Release, supra note 92, at 1 (indicating the average cost of a private
room in a nursing home is $213 per day, or $77,745 a year, for a private room).
221 See Cosca, supra note 86, at 21 (indicating the median compensation of college gradu-
ates is $36,155 per year).
222 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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insurance data suggesting that the $113 million total is too low to re-
present the amount paid by the industry. Insurance data indicate that
Honda's average settlement per claim was $859,000,223 while another
source says that 40 percent of settlements were between $250,000 and $1
million and another 20 percent were more than $1 million. 224
Our calculations of extended costs between $288,900 and $2.4 mil-
lion per family are subject to the same qualifications as the Ford-Fire-
stone SUV and Baycol scenarios. The ATV estimates likewise depend
on assumptions made about the nature of the injuries that were suffered
and the duration of various costs. While a different construction of the
scenarios would produce a different estimate, we believe the scenarios
represent a realistic range of outcomes of ATV accidents. Nevertheless,
each scenario could be alternatively constructed to produce both lower
costs and higher costs. The calculations underestimate extended costs,
because inflation is not taken into account. We treat the loss of employ-
ment as a reduction in social wealth based on the existence of frictional
employment.
CONCLUSIONS
No one has previously attempted a direct measurement of the exter-
nal costs of dangerous products. Our efforts support several conclusions
regarding public policy.
First, the tort system provides a valuable service for society to the
extent it successfully deters the sale of dangerous products. The three
case studies reveal that dangerous products have the potential to create
significant external costs. According to a COI measurement, the three
products we studied alone created nearly $4.7 billion in external costs, 225
and this estimate does not include the cost of pain and suffering or any of
the extended costs described in our scenarios. Although the tort system
does not necessarily succeed in forcing the manufacturers of dangerous
products to internalize all external costs, it does cause manufacturers to
bear some meaningful portion of those costs. The tort system therefore
serves societal interests by deterring the sale of dangerous products, and
the value of this deterrence, in economic terms, is very substantial.
Second, it appears compensation awarded in the tort system falls
short of the actual costs created by dangerous products. However, our
evidence for this conclusion is subject to two caveats. First, we had dif-
ficulty comparing our results with payouts by manufacturers because of
the lack of reliable, complete information about such payouts. Second,
223 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
225 This total was derived by adding the sum of the COI costs for each of the three prod-
ucts: $554,845,787 + 248,209,044 + 3,892,537,700 = $4,695,592,531.
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our results are mixed, with ATV-COI costs being substantially higher
than payouts ($3.893 billion versus $113 million), 226 Ford-Firestone
SUVs COI costs being less than payouts ($555 million versus $590 mil-
lion (Ford) and $800 million (Firestone)),227 and Baycol COI costs being
substantially less than payouts ($284 million versus $1.154 billion).2 28
However, we may have significantly underestimated SUV costs because
our starting point was the lowest available number of fatalities and inju-
ries from the SUV crashes.2 29 Likewise, we may have significantly un-
derstated Baycol costs because of the limitations in available data. Our
medical costs, for example, were drawn from hospital data on the costs
of treating disorders of muscle, ligament, and fascia, and our estimate
does not include the cost of dialysis. 230 Finally, the available COI esti-
mates likely underestimate the actual COI because they do not take into
account extended costs, although we have no way of estimating the im-
pact of this omission.
TABLE 19: TRADITIONAL AND EXTENDED COSTS COMPARED ACROSS
DANGEROUS PRODUCT EXTENT OF INJURY, AND
FAMILY SITUATION
Ratio of Extended
Dangerous Traditional Extended o to
Product Costs Costs Trdt oTraditional Costs
Firestone Tire/Ford Explorer
Low Range $4,194 $740,254 177-1
Medium Range $74,325 $1,476,136 20-1
High Cost Range $1,697,279 $2,554,783 2-1
Baycol
Low Range $45,582 $159,349 3-1
Medium Range $333,916 $1,057,037 3-1
High Cost Range $1,246,472 $2,206,630 2-1
All Terrain Vehicles
Low Range $4,045 $288,692 71-1
Medium Range $84,023 $577,404 7-1
High Cost Range $1,422,085 $2,385,644 2-1
Third, product defects produce significant costs beyond the medical
costs and lost productivity we measured by the COI methodology. Our
226 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
227 See McDonald, Separations, Blow-Outs and Fallout, supra note 76, at 1077-78.
228 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
229 Id.
230 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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results, shown in Table 19, suggest that extended costs may far outstrip
traditional costs. For Table 19, we created a low-, medium-, and high-
range scenario of traditional COI costs for each case study,23' and com-
pared these costs to the extended cost scenarios used in each of our case
studies. 232 While traditional costs ranged from $4,045 to $1,697,279 per
case, extended costs ranged from $159,349 to $2,554,783. All numbers
are in 2007 dollars. In each case study, whether for a low, medium, or
high level of expenditures, extended costs were at least two times greater
than traditional costs.
It is difficult to compare cost categories because each medical case
is unique, and the way that each family responds to tragedy is also
unique. The specific injuries described in the traditional costs column do
not necessarily correlate with the specific injuries described in the ex-
tended cost scenarios. Despite these variables, as a general trend, the
table strongly suggests that families or other third parties bear substantial
costs not accounted for by traditional COI methodology. This is signifi-
cant because, as our scenarios suggest, families can suffer unfortunate,
life-altering changes when one or more family members are seriously
injured by dangerous products. In addition, because our estimates of ex-
tended costs do not take into account future inflation, they understate the
full economic impact on families.
The ultimate impact on families depends on the extent to which they
can recover compensation for traditional as well as extended social costs.
We have no way of knowing the extent to which this occurs. However,
we suspect that due to imperfections in the tort system, when one or
more family members are injured or killed by dangerous products, the
231 For Firestone/Ford Explorer, the low range COI cost is based on a male, age sixty,
who had injuries not requiring hospitalization. The medium range estimate assumes a female,
age forty, who had injuries requiring hospitalization. The high cost estimate contemplates a
male, age 20, who died from his injuries. See discussion supra Part mI.B-C. The number-of-
persons figures were divided by the total cost figures in the COI Methodology Appendix to
arrive at the per-person costs that appear in Table 19. See COI Methodology Appendix, supra
note 49, at Ford/Firestone Table 8. For Baycol, we based the low range cost on a male,
seventy years old, who was hospitalized. The medium estimate assumes a female, older than
seventy years old, with a permanent severe disability. The high cost estimate is based on a
male, age sixty, who has a permanent severe disability. The number-of-persons figures were
divided by the total cost figures in the COI Methodology Appendix to arrive at the per-person
costs that appear in Table 19. See discussion supra Part I.NB-C. Finally, the low cost ATV
estimate reflects the COI costs of a female, age thirty-five, who suffers injuries but is not
hospitalized. The medium estimate is calculated on the basis of a female, age seventeen, who
is injured and hospitalized. We measured the high cost estimate on the basis of a male, age
seventeen, who died from his injuries. The number-of-persons figures were divided by the
total cost figures in the COI Methodology Appendix to arrive at the per-person costs that
appear in Table 19. See discussion supra Part V.B-C.
232 The lowest estimate of extended costs for each set of scenarios is treated at the low-
range estimate. The middle estimate is treated as the medium-range estimate. The highest
estimate is considered to be the high-range estimate.
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amount of compensation may be considerably less than the costs paid by
families over the long-term.
When a family is unable to bear the costs of dangerous products,
some of those costs will be shifted to taxpayers via public sector pro-
grams. If, for example, a family does not recover compensation to pay
for a health aide or housekeeper to help a disabled person, taxpayers will
pay for these services if the disabled person qualifies for a safety net
program. Though this means that taxpayers are likely on the hook for
some of the external costs of dangerous products, the extent of this shift
in costs cannot be determined for purposes this study.
Finally, it is simply not possible to account for the permanent, life-
changing aspects of the tragedies associated with the three products we
have studied. Psychological trauma and physical suffering are not mea-
sured, nor are other burdens that cannot be monetized. This limitation
does not make these "costs" any less real to those who suffer them. Con-
sequently, the deterrence function of the tort system provides incalcula-
ble value by protecting many families against the pain, grief, and
suffering caused by dangerous products.
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